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Foreign aid from China is often characterized as ‘rogue aid’ that is not guided by recipient 
need but by China’s national interests alone. However, no econometric study so far confronts 
this claim with data. We make use of various datasets, covering the 1956-2006 period, to 
empirically test to which extent political and commercial interests shape China’s  aid 
allocation decisions. We estimate the determinants of China’s allocation of project aid, food 
aid, medical teams and total aid money to developing countries, comparing its allocation 
decisions with traditional and other so-called emerging donors. We find that political 
considerations are an important determinant of China’s allocation of aid. However, in 
comparison to other donors, China does not pay substantially more attention to politics. In 
contrast to widespread perceptions, we find no evidence that China’s aid allocation is 
dominated by natural resource endowments. Moreover, China’s allocation of aid seems to be 
widely independent of democracy and governance in recipient countries. Overall, 
denominating aid from China as ‘rogue aid’ seems unjustified. 
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1. Introduction 
Development aid plays a  pivotal role as an economic reward and punishment mechanism 
between nations. An extensive literature on the allocation of aid by traditional donors exists, 
which emphasizes that aid is frequently given for political reasons rather than economic needs 
(e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2005; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher et al. 
2009a, 2009b; Kilby 2011). With the ongoing redistribution of world power, so-called new 
donor countries appear and might (ab)use development aid to push through their interests. 
Only  recently  have  scholars  started  analyzing  the  allocation  of  aid  from  these  so-called 
emerging donors with quantitative methods (see Neumayer 2003a, 2004; Dreher et al. 2011). 
According  to  the  results  in  Dreher  et al.  (2011),  ‘new’ donors  attach  less  importance  to 
recipient need than Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors when allocating aid. 
However, concerns that commercial  self-interest distorts  the  allocation  of  aid  seem  to  be 
overstated for new and old donors alike. Arguably, these findings might be driven by the 
omission of the major ‘new’ donor, China.
1 
China is often described as the chief villain among the ‘new’ donors. Naím (2007) 
characterizes its development aid as ‘rogue aid’ as it is not guided by need in the developing 
countries, but rather by China’s national interests. The determinants of Chinese development 
assistance are, according to Naím, access to resources and boosting international alliances. 
Moreover, ‘rogue donors’ are said to undermine the development efforts of Western donors to 
promote  good  governance  in  the  developing  world.  However,  this  verdict  is  based  on 
selective case studies only. No empirical study exists confronting the various claims about 
Chinese  ‘rogue  aid’  with  data.  This  is  because  comprehensive  data  on  the  allocation  of 
China’s development aid are difficult to obtain.
2 
In this paper, we make use of various datasets on the allocation of Chinese foreign aid. 
First, we use data on the number of aid projects completed. Data are obtained from Bartke 
(1989), who collected news items on China’s economic aid between 1956 and 1987, and from 
the China Commerce Yearbook that covers the  1990-2005 period (Ministry of Commerce 
1984-2009). Second, we use data on the estimated amount of Chinese foreign aid (in US$) 
that has been provided to recipient countries until the mid-1980s. Data are collected from 
                                                 
1 Taken literally, China is not a new donor. Its aid program already started in the 1950s. By 1975, it provided aid 
to more African countries than the United States (Brautigam 2008). This is true for many other “new” donors as 
well. What is new however, is the attention they receive. Apart from that, China does not perceive itself as a 
donor but rather as a partner in “South-South cooperation” (Davies 2007). 
2 In the words of Berthélemy (2009: 2), “data are simply not available.” Berthélemy (2009) thus uses data on 
contracted projects with Chinese companies as a proxy for aid, given that aid is usually tied to contracts with 
Chinese companies. While aid projects are arguably related to amounts of aid, they cannot be distinguished from 
foreign direct investment with this approach. 3 
 
various intelligence reports of the CIA (1975-1984), from an OECD study (1987) and again 
from Bartke (1989). Third, we make use of data on the number of medical teams that have 
been dispatched, also collected from the China Commerce Yearbook. Finally, we employ a 
dataset on food aid (World Food Programme 2011), which reports the amount of emergency 
aid, program aid and project aid  in tons of grain equivalent allocated since 1988 for 108 
donors, including China. 
We  use  these  data  to  empirically  test  the  various  hypotheses  about  China’s  aid 
allocation  proposed  in  the  previous  literature.  First,  we  analyze  China’s  allocation  of 
development aid in five phases of the Chinese aid program between 1956 and 2006. Second, 
in  a  cross-section  of  132 recipient countries  over  the  1996-2005 period,  we  compare  the 
allocation of China’s project aid to that of DAC and emerging donor countries. 
  To  foreshadow  our  results,  we  find  that  political  considerations  are  an  important 
determinant of China’s allocation of aid. However, when we compare its allocation to those of 
other donors, China does not pay significantly more attention to politics. We find only mixed 
evidence  that  commercial  motives  determine  China’s  aid  allocation  decisions.  Neither 
democracy nor governance play an important role. Overall, denominating aid from China as 
‘rogue aid’ thus seems unjustified. 
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our data on China’s allocation of 
aid, while outlining our hypotheses regarding the determinants of China’s aid allocation in 
Section  3.  The  method  of  estimation  and  our  main  econometric  results  are  presented  in 
Section 4. In Section 5, we compare China’s allocation of aid to those of the DAC and other 
‘new’ donors. The final section concludes the paper and draws policy implications. 
 
2. Measuring Chinese aid 
A substantial number of players are involved in the Chinese development assistance program 
(Davies 2007; Brautigam 2008, 2010; Kobayashi 2008). Strategic decisions are made by the 
State Council, which is the highest authority of the state administration. The main government 
body responsible for China’s aid is the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). However, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)  is also  involved.  Another major player  is the Export-
Import Bank – China Exim Bank – established in 1994, which provides concessional loans 
and  export  credits.  Also  set  up  in  1994,  the  China  Development  Bank  (CDB)  offers 4 
 
commercial credits and is expected to provide the bulk of the additional resources to Africa 
promised in the “new strategic partnership” (Davies 2007).
3 
Estimations of the total size of China’s aid flows vary considerably. In 2006, Premier 
Wen Jiabao quantified Chinese aid to Africa over the 1949-2006 period to be about US$5.6 
billion (He 2006). According to Davies (2007) however, this figure is considered to be too 
low by Chinese scholars she interviewed. She provides data on concessional loans by the 
China Exim Bank outstanding in February 2007, which amount to US$8-9 billion (as reported 
in Manning 2007: 7).  She also  cites estimates from Kurlantzick (2006), estimating aid to 
Africa  to  be  worth  US$2.7  billion  in  2004,  the  United  Kingdom’s  Department  for 
International Development (DFID),
4 estimating aid for Africa amounting to US$1.3-1.4 in 
2006, and Qi (2007), who estimates aid for Africa to be worth US$1.05 billion and China’s 
total  aid  budget  to  be  US$1.38  in  2007.  According  to  the  Financial  Times,  China 
outperformed the World Bank as the world’s largest provider of overseas loans to developing 
countries through its China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank amounting to 
at least US$110 billion in 2009 and 2010.
5 Parts of the huge variations between the estimates 
stem from different delineations of which flows are considered as development aid. Missing 
information of the degree of concessionality of Chinese loans makes it difficult to apply the 
definition of official development assistance (ODA) from the DAC.
6 
With  the  intention  to  meet  objections  that  China  does  not  provide  sufficient 
information on its aid program, the Chinese government published a White Paper on China’s 
Foreign Aid (State Council 2011). According to this official document, China has provided 
aid to 161 countries until 2009, of which 123 developing countries received aid on a regular 
basis. This  corresponds  to 256.29 billion  yuan  (US$38.54 billion),  of  which  41.4%  were 
provided as grants, 29.9% as interest-free loans and 28.7% in the form of concessional loans 
(State  Council  2011).  Still,  it  is  not  clear  which  financial  flows  are  included  in  these 
calculations. Moreover, the Chinese government declines to publish full information on its 
annual bilateral aid allocations. 
                                                 
3 According to Davies (2007), further actors are the Chinese embassies, which monitor project implementation, 
and the Ministry of Finance, which negotiates the yearly aid budget and is in charge of China’s contributions to 
international financial organizations. The Ministry of Health is involved when it comes to medical and health 
projects.  Similarly,  the  Ministries  of  Education,  Agriculture  and  Science  and  Technology  are  in  charge  of 
China’s aid in their respective fields. 
4 According to an unpublished document, DFID China, January 3, 2007. 
5 “China’s lending hits new heights,” Financial Times, January 17, 2011. 
6  Brautigam  (2008)  lists  package  financing  of  concessional  loans  together  with  export  credits,  multi-year 
reporting of aid and media mistakes as additional sources of overestimated aid figures. Note that ODA is defined 
as concessional financial flows to developing countries that are provided by official agencies with the objective 
to  promote  economic  development  and  welfare  and  that  contain  a  grant  element  of  at  least  25%  (see 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/14/26415658.PDF, accessed August 2011). 5 
 
Nevertheless, we are able to make use of several data sources that provide information 
on  four  variables that capture  the  lion’s  share  of China’s  foreign  aid activities since  the 
foundation of its aid program in the 1950s and that by and large qualify as ODA.
7 First, we 
use data on the number of aid projects completed from Bartke (1989) and from the China 
Commerce  Yearbook  (Ministry  of  Commerce  1984-2009).  Bartke  (1989)  collected  2,500 
news items on China’s economic aid between 1956 and 1987.
8 Most of them were collected 
from the Chinese press, with less than 10% originating from secondary sources (mainly from 
the recipient countries). 528 completed aid projects in 69 developing countries (plus Kuwait 
and  Malta)  are  recorded  in  the  dataset.  The  first  completed  aid project  registered  in  the 
database was the construction of a textile mill in Thamaing (Burma) in 1956. The single most 
outstanding project was the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway line. Bartke (1989) 
stresses that only small projects may be missing in the dataset, which presumably was the 
case if China felt that they were not sufficiently important to be published. 
Data  on  completed  aid  projects  for  more  recent  years  are  obtained  from  China’s 
Ministry of Commerce (1984-2009), which provides this information in the China Commerce 
Yearbook and its predecessors. This information on aid projects completed during the 1990-
2005  period  was  compiled  in  a  comprehensive  dataset  by  Hawkins  et  al.  (2010)  and  is 
publicly available. The first completed aid project recorded in the dataset was the construction 
of a sporting complex  in Jordan in 1990, and  the  last one  was the  provision of teaching 
appliances, medical apparatus and agricultural machines to Colombia in 2005. Altogether, the 
dataset consists of 304 aid projects provided to 97 developing countries (and Malta). 
At first, it may seem as a drawback that these data only cover aid projects run by the 
Ministry of Commerce and exclude those administered by the Exim  Bank and  the China 
Development  Bank  (as  well  as  technical  assistance).  However,  loans  from  the  China 
Development  Bank are  not  concessional  in  nature  and  therefore  do  not qualify as ODA. 
Although the Exim Bank partly provides concessional loans, it is contestable whether these 
flows should be considered as ODA. According to Brautigam (2011: 761), “the large lines of 
credit offered by Chinese policy banks are not provided as ODA but represent OOF [other 
official flows], chiefly export credits.” The advantage of the omission of data from both banks 
is that the remaining projects run by the Ministry of Commerce itself can be considered as 
                                                 
7 For a discussion  on which  of China’s  aid  flows are likely to qualify  as ODA see  Kobayashi (2008) and 
Brautigam (2011). 
8 The NYU Wagner School has also collected data based on news items (Lum et al. 2009). However, these data 
are unavailable to the public. 6 
 
ODA,
9 which will allow as a meaningful comparison with ODA allocation of DAC donors in 
Section 5. Appendix C provides a detailed explanation of the construction of the database of 
China’s project aid. 
The share of China’s aid projects completed  in  a particular  recipient country over 
various periods is represented graphically in Figures 1-5.
10 Over the 1956-69 period (Figure 
1), few countries received aid from China, and those that did were exclusively located in 
Africa, the Arabian peninsula and in China’s immediate neighborhood. Figure 2 shows the 
expansion of China’s aid in Africa in the 1970-78 period and the first projects carried out in 
Latin America. This expansion continues further in the years 1979-87 (Figure 3). As can be 
seen in Figures 4 and 5, China’s expansion focused on Latin America in the early 1990s, and 
on Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the 1996-2005 period. 
 
Figure 1: Number of aid projects completed (% of China’s total aid, 1956-1969) 
 
Note: No information available on Albania, Cuba, Mongolia, People’s Republic of Korea and Vietnam (shaded area). 
 
                                                 
9 According to Brautigam (2011: 756), “[b]y and large, activities financed out of their external assistance budget 
largely parallel the kinds of activities financed by DAC donors.” The State Council (2011) notes that complete 
projects are provided as grants or interest-free loans. 
10 The choice of periods is explained below. 7 
 
Figure 2: Number of aid projects completed (% of China’s total aid, 1970-1978) 
 




Figure 3: Number of aid projects completed (% of China’s total aid, 1979-1987) 
 
Note: No information available on Albania, Cuba, Mongolia, People’s Republic of Korea and Vietnam (shaded area).8 
 









Second, we study China’s allocation of aid amounts in US$. Data are collected from various 
intelligence reports of the CIA (1975-1984), from a study of the OECD (1987), and from 
Bartke (1989). The estimates of China’s total aid to recipient countries retrieved from Bartke 
(1989)  include  loans  and  donations  and  are  compiled  from  Chinese  sources,  secondary 
sources  and  the  author’s  estimates.  Tanzania  was  the  single  most  important  recipient  of 
Chinese economic aid between 1956 and 1987. 62.0% of China’s economic aid between 1956 
and  1987  have  been  provided  to  Africa,  highlighting  China’s  aspirations  to  become  the 
leading power in the Third  World (Bartke 1989). 22.7% of China’s economic aid  in this 
period were provided to Asia, with the intention of creating “friendly relations with its closest 
neighbours” (Bartke 1989: 10). 9 
 
The  second  dataset  on  aid  amounts  (US$)  has  been  established  based  on  several 
intelligence  reports  from  the  CIA  (1975-1984).  This  series  of  handbooks  served  as  the 
intelligence community’s official database on foreign aid activities of communist countries. 
Data are taken from the most recent report, with missing years being completed using older 
reports. The established dataset covers economic aid extended to non-communist recipient 
countries in the 1956-1984 period.
11 Concessional loans and grants are both included. The 
third dataset is from the OECD (1987). It reports aid commitments in US$ for the 1970-1985 
period. The information has been collected from news items from the Xinhua news agency, 
statements by recipient countries and press reports. The OECD judges its aid data as reliable, 
with the exception of aid flows to Vietnam and North Korea.
12 
When interpreting the amounts, one should keep in mind that our data on Chinese aid 
amounts have several drawbacks. Aid amounts may be underreported as all three sources rely 
on unofficial estimates. Furthermore, aid amounts are not directly comparable to Western aid 
as  they  include  comparably  low  costs  for  Chinese  workers  participating  in  the  projects. 
Starting with Mao Zedong until the reign of Deng Xiaoping, all workers in aid programs were 
paid according to the wage  level in the respective recipient country. According to Bartke 
(1989), Chinese aid volumes should thus be multiplied by at least ten in order to compare 
them to projects carried out by Western donors. 
Third,  we  examine  China’s  allocation  of  medical  teams  dispatched  to  developing 
countries. Starting in 1963 in Algeria, medical teams are usually sent to underdeveloped areas 
to  cure patients, train local medical staff and improve medical and  health services in the 
recipient  countries  (State  Council  2011).  Data  are  obtained  from  the  China  Commerce 
Yearbook (Ministry of Commerce 1984-2009) and cover the 1983-1994 period (except 1993). 
Throughout this period, medical teams were dispatched to 45 countries. In 1984 alone, China 
claims to have treated about one million patients (Ministry of Commerce 1985). 
Fourth,  we  make  use  of  a  dataset  on  food  aid  from  the  International  Food  Aid 
Information System (FAIS), which was developed by the World Food Programme (2011). 
The amount  of  food  aid  is  reported in  tons of  grain  equivalent  for  109  donor  countries, 
including China, since 1988 and is continuously updated.
13 The values include commodities 
                                                 
11 Therefore, the dataset does not cover aid flows to the following communist countries: Cambodia (after 1975), 
Cuba, Laos (after 1975), North Korea, Vietnam and Yugoslavia. In addition, aid to South Africa is not reported. 
12 Both countries have been excluded from the dataset. Also, in some cases the dataset indicates that a country 
received aid from China without quantifying it. Therefore, the reported aid values from the OECD should be 
treated as lower bound estimates. 
13 Neumayer (2005) analyzes the determinants of food aid in the 1990s and finds that the United States and the 
European Union use it to reward their political allies. His study does neither cover China nor other emerging 
donors however. Note that we employ data on food aid measured in tons of grain equivalent rather than simply 10 
 
delivered or locally purchased. Food aid is grouped into three  categories: Emergency aid, 
project aid and program aid. While emergency aid is intended to support the victims of natural 
or man-made disasters, project aid supports specific poverty-reduction and disaster-prevention 
activities. In contrast, program food aid is not targeted at specific beneficiary groups and takes 
the form of a resource transfer for balance-of-payments or budgetary support. China provides 
all three types of aid. Arguably, food aid and, in particular, emergency food aid is less likely 
to suffer from political biases compared to other forms of aid. Between 1990 and 2006, China 
supplied 41 countries with food aid, of which the largest delivery went as emergency aid to 
North Korea in 2005 (531,416 tons of grain equivalent). 
 
Figure 6: China’s foreign aid over time 
 
Note: No annual aid amounts available from CIA before 1967 and from OECD before 1976. 
 
Based on these four aid indicators, Figure 6 provides an overview of the evolution of China’s 
aid program over time. As can be seen, the number of aid projects follows a positive trend, 
but volatility is high. Aid amounts peaked in the early 1970s and fluctuated in the second half 
of the 1970s and the 1980s at around US$600 million (constant year 2000) according to the 
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Bartke and CIA measure. The estimates from the OECD are lower and fluctuate at around 
US$350  million  (constant  year  2000).  The  number  of  medical  teams  dispatched  is 
substantially  lower  in  the  1990s  compared  to  the  1980s,  while  food  aid  only  reaches 
noteworthy amounts since 1996. Appendix D shows the resulting shares of each recipient in 
China’s total aid for each aid indicator. 
 
3. Need, merit and self-interest – is China different? 
3.1 A brief history of China’s aid program 
China began providing foreign assistance to developing countries in 1950 with aid to North 
Korea and extended its aid to non-communist countries in 1956 in the aftermath of the Asian-
African conference in Bandung (State Council 2011). According to Bartke (1989), Cambodia, 
Nepal and Egypt were  the  first (non-communist) recipient countries  in 1956. China’s aid 
policy can be divided into five phases.
14 In the first phase (1956-1969), China’s aid, which at 
that time only consisted of grants and interest-free loans, is said to have been mainly driven 
by political and ideological considerations. China supported African countries’ independence 
movements and used its aid to support resistance against colonial powers (e.g., Davies 2007). 
Even then, the principles of giving aid stressed the self-reliance of the recipient countries and 
mutual benefit.
15 The 9th Party Congress in 1969 can be seen as the starting point of the 
second phase (1970-1978). The amount of aid delivered sharply increased, which is seen as 
being in line with Mao Zedong’s claim to assume political leadership in the Third World. In 
line with this claim to power, China replaced Taiwan on the United Nations Security Council 
in 1971, which was supposedly supported by aid flows to African countries (Davies 2007). 
However, after the death of the Communist Party’s Vice Chairman Lin Biao in the same year, 
economic aid was squeezed  in 1973 through the influence  of Prime Minister  Zhou Enlai 
(Bartke 1989). 
After  the  death of Mao Zedong  in 1976,  China opened its doors to  the  West and 
pursued more pragmatic foreign (and aid) policies.
16 Deng Xiaoping took the leadership of the 
Communist  Party  in  December  1978,  which  initiates  the  third  phase  (1979-1989).  His 
economic reform program,  labeled “Reform and Opening Up,”  started introducing market 
                                                 
14 Davies (2007), Brautigam (2008, 2010) and Kobayashi (2008) provide a detailed overview on the history of 
China’s aid program. See also Lin (1995) for a good overview on the history of research on China’s foreign aid 
by both Chinese and Western scholars. 
15 The principles have been put forward by China’s Premier Zhou Enlai while visiting Africa in 1964 (Davies 
2007; Brautigam 2008). 
16 Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang stressed four new principles on the economic and technical cooperation between 
China and Africa in the early 1980s: Equality and mutual beneﬁt, stress on practical results, diversity in form, 
and common progress (as listed in Brautigam 2010). 12 
 
principles  and  gradually  opened  the  Chinese  economy  to  foreign  investment  and  trade. 
Economic considerations became more influential in China’s aid allocation decisions. The 
scale of individual projects was reduced, but mutually advantageous programs were promoted 
(OECD 1987). While Chinese aid was provided as interest-free long-term loans or grants in 
the beginning, conditions became stricter, but were still very favorable in the 1980s: The grant 
element of Chinese  aid fluctuated between 60  and  75 percent over  the  1980-1985 period 
(OECD 1987). Another new focus of China’s foreign aid in the 1980s was the emphasis on 
the upgrading and maintenance of existing projects.
17 
The fourth phase (1990-1995) started after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. 
China sought actively for diplomatic support and increased its aid substantially, in particular 
to African countries (Taylor 1998; Brautigam 2008, 2010). As pointed out by Taylor (1998), 
African reactions to the massacre were substantially softer compared to Western reactions, 
and sometimes even supportive. According to Taylor (1998: 450), “[s]uch a[n aid] policy was 
a quick and comparatively cheap way by which Beijing could reward those countries that had 
stood by China during the 1989 crisis as well as cementing relations for the future.” 
At the same time, planners “were well aware that resource scarcities, particularly in 
domestic energy, would soon become an issue for domestic production, and they moved to 
position the country to overcome that challenge” (Brautigam 2008: 11). The importance of 
economic considerations is said to have become more and more predominant in China’s aid 
strategy (Davies 2007; Pehnelt 2007). In particular, the aid reform of 1995 introduced market-
oriented  principles  and  emphasized  the  linkages  between  aid,  trade  and  investment 
(Brautigam 2010). This reform, after which “China’s aid activities have entered a completely 
different  phase  compared  to  the  previous  periods”  (Kobayashi  2008:  7),  is  taken  as  the 
starting point for the fifth phase (1996-2006). The central aim of the reform was to multiply 
the ways in which foreign financing is supplied to developing countries. In addition to grants 
and  interest-free  loans  as a  flexible  and  quick  form of  financing,  China  offered  interest-
subsidized preferential loans as well as joint ventures and cooperations of complete projects. 
A  new  era  for  China’s  aid  program started  in  2006  with China  declaring  a  “new 
strategic partnership” at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). China announced 
to double its 2006 aid effort to Africa by 2009 with the aim “to reach the target of mutual 
                                                 
17 These consolidation efforts included overhaul and provision of equipment, supply of accessories and spare 
parts, technical guidance and involvement of Chinese nationals in management and the operation of completed 
projects (Ministry of Commerce 1986: 487). 13 
 





Chinese aid is not linked to conditions typically imposed by Western donors such as good 
policies, democracy or respect for human rights. Furthermore, Chinese financial assistance is 
quickly made available (e.g., Davies 2007).
19 China is thus a welcome alternative to DAC 
donors with their bureaucratic procedures  and detailed policy conditionality. At the same 
time, development aid from China is criticized as being driven by domestic economic and 
political  interests  to  a  higher  extent  than  development  aid  from  traditional  DAC  donors. 
Motives for the allocation of aid can be broadly grouped into three categories; first, aid should 
depend on need; second, the quality of policies and institutions might matter; and third, the 
donor’s commercial or political self-interests have been shown to play a role (e.g., Alesina 
and Dollar 2000). We discuss these motives in turn. 
With respect  to  poverty and development,  the  Ministry of Commerce  (1985: 413) 
emphasizes that its aid projects play “a positive role in expanding the national economies of 
the recipient countries and improving the material and cultural life of the people in these 
countries.”  Emphasizing  the  idea  of  ‘mutual  benefit’,  the  ministry  claims  “to  help  the 
recipient countries develop their national economies and bring about economic progress for 
both China and these countries” (Ministry of Commerce 1985: 413). The State Council (2011: 
6) emphasizes the need orientation in China’s aid allocation by claiming that the country “sets 
great store by people’s living conditions and economic development of recipient countries, 
making great efforts to ensure its aid benefits as many needy people as possible.” In the early 
1980s, even the CIA (1980: 6) confirmed that the Chinese aid program “fits the needs of the 
poorest LDCs [least developed countries].” More recently, Brautigam (2008: 7) stresses that 
China uses its aid to reflect its “vision of itself as a responsible, significant power, quick to 
deliver  humanitarian  assistance.”  Its  focus  on  infrastructure  projects  might  foster 
developmental  needs  largely  neglected  by  DAC  donors  (Brautigam  2008).  These  views 
                                                 
18 President Hu Jintao presented a “five point pledge” at the United Nations in 2005, promising debt relief and 
increased aid flows. Eight concrete measures with regard to Africa followed at the FOCAC meeting in 2006 
(Davies 2007; Brautigam 2010). 
19 Hilsum (2006: 7) quotes the Ethiopian ambassador to Beijing: “If a G8 country had wanted to rebuild the 
stadium, for example, we’d still be holding meetings! The Chinese just come and do it. They don’t start to hold 
meetings  about  environmental  impact  assessment,  human  rights,  bad  governance  and  good  governance.” 
Brautigam (2008: 21) quotes Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, who said in 2006 that “[w]ith the Asian 
countries it’s fast and it’s direct.” 14 
 
largely contradict Naím’s (2007: 95) claim that rogue donors as China “couldn’t care less 
about the long-term well-being of the population of the countries they “aid.”” 
Concerning  the  quality  of  policies  and  institutions,  China  is  likely  to  allocate  aid 
according  to  the  so-called  Beijing  Consensus,  rather  than  the  Washington  Consensus.
20 
China’s approach consists of principles such as non-interference in a country’s internal affairs 
and  respect  for  sovereignty  (Davies  2007;  Brautigam  2008).  The  Ministry  of  Commerce 
(1990:  63)  itself claims  that  it pays  “full respect  for  the recipient’s  sovereignty, without 
attaching any conditions and not asking for any special privileges, which displayed the true 
spirit of sincere cooperation.” Chinese aid “comes without Western lectures about governance 
and human rights” (The Economist May 6
th, 2010).
21 We would thus expect Chinese aid to be 
unaffected by policies and institutions in the recipient countries. It has even been argued that 
China may concentrate on recipient countries with rather bad governance (Halper 2010). In 
the words of Pehnelt (2007: 8), since China faces “higher opportunity costs of morality and 
governance and human rights oriented policies” compared with DAC donors, China has a 
“comparative advantage” in providing assistance to “unstable and problematic regions and 
rogue  states.”  Kaplinsky  et  al.  (2007)  point  out  that  China  sometimes  gives  substantial 
amounts of aid to fragile states. 
Still, it is open to debate whether Chinese aid differs significantly from the allocation 
of DAC aid in terms of rewarding “deserving” recipient countries with better governance. 
This is because previous research points to a considerable gap between the DAC rhetoric of 
rewarding  good  governance  and  their  actual  allocation  of  aid.  For  instance,  Isopi  and 
Mattesini (2010) show that Germany, Finland, France, Japan, and the Netherlands give more, 
rather than less, aid to more corrupt countries.
22 It is frequently expected that absent of any 
conditionality,  Chinese  aid will weaken democracy, governance, and human rights, fail to 
promote development, weaken social and environmental standards, and increase corruption 
(e.g.,  Davies  2007).
23  According  to  Taylor  (1998),  China  enthusiastically  opposed 
                                                 
20 Ramo (2004) compares the two. While the Beijing Consensus has been criticized of misrepresenting China’s 
reforms (Kennedy 2010), the concept might still be informative. 
21 See also Alden (2005), Tull (2006) and Lammers (2007). Halper (2010: 100) cites president Museveni of 
Uganda: “The Western ruling groups are conceited, full of themselves, ignorant of our conditions, and they make 
other people’s business their business, while the Chinese just deal with you as one who represents your country, 
and  for  them  they  represent  their  own  interests  and  you  just  do business.”  Tull  (2006:  466-467)  quotes  a 
spokesman of the Kenyan government as follows: “You never hear the Chinese saying that they will not finish a 
project because the government has not done enough to tackle corruption.” 
22 See  also Alesina and Weder (2002). Similarly, Neumayer (2003b) find no consistent evidence that DAC 
donors reward recipients with a good human rights record. 
23 As one example, European Investment Bank president Philippe Maystadt claims that “[t]hey [i.e., the Chinese] 
don’t bother about social or human rights conditions” (Financial Times, November 28, 2006). However, given 15 
 
democratization  in Africa  as it could use  failed African democratizations as an argument 
against demands for its own democratization.
24 
Turning to self-interest, facilitating the export of natural resources to China is seen as 
a  central aim of Chinese  aid.  China’s  “insatiable needs” for resources (oil,  minerals, and 
timber in particular) are mentioned most frequently as commercial motives of its aid (e.g., 
Alden 2005; Tull 2006; Davies 2007; Naím 2007; Halper 2010). The Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce  is the  head agency  in the provision of bilateral  aid.  This clearly  indicates the 
overriding importance of commercial motives (Lammers 2007). Based on data for Chinese 
foreign aid collected through news research, Lum et al. (2009) suggest that Chinese aid to 
Africa  and  Latin  America  is  determined  by economic  interests, mainly motivated  by  the 
extraction of natural resources. For aid going to Southeast Asia however, Lum et al. conclude 
that longer-term diplomatic and strategic interests seem to play the predominant role. 
In addition to resource security, Chinese aid is accused of targeting future access to 
export markets and profitable investments (Davies 2007; Lum et al. 2009). Medical aid, for 
example, is considered as a tool to improve the reputation of Chinese medicine and as “a 
clever  and  low  cost  way  to  introduce  Chinese-made  medications  to  the  African  market” 
(Shinn 2006). Chinese aid is tied, which is a further indication that China uses aid to improve 
business opportunities (Pehnelt 2007; Schüller et al. 2010). The Ministry of Commerce (1999: 
75)  openly  concluded  from  aid  activities  in  1998  that,  through  aid,  China’s  “enterprises 
entered the markets of the developing countries very quickly  and  were  welcomed by the 
governments and enterprises of these countries.” 
Turning to political motivations of China’s aid allocation, the Ministry of Commerce 
(1996: 70) openly admits that grants are used to coordinate diplomatic work and that the 
construction of “some public institutions […] produced great political influences.” Moreover, 
the aid program is aimed at supporting high-level diplomatic events. For example, to achieve 
a higher participation of heads of state or heads of government in the opening and closing 
ceremonies of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, China “speeded up the implementation of 
the projects concerned by bilateral leaders” (Ministry of Commerce 2009: 348). According to 
the State Council (2011: 3), however, “China never uses foreign aid as a means to […] seek 
political privileges for itself.” 
                                                                                                                                                     
that Chinese aid is given in kind rather than cash, it might also be less prone to corruption. China clearly tries to 
tackle corruption where repayment of its loans is at risk (Brautigam 2008). 
24 According to Deng Xiaoping, “talk about human rights, freedom and democracy is only designed to safeguard 
the interests of the strong, rich countries [who] practice power politics” (as quoted in Taylor, 1998: 453). 16 
 
The literature has given special attention to the political motivation of Chinese aid 
allocation to Africa.
25  As  Davies (2007:  27) points  out,  “Africa  is  important for  China’s 
policy agenda and the building of alliances.” It provided support for getting China a seat in 
the United Nations Security Council (Davies 2007). Specifically, China uses aid to realize its 
“One-China policy,” rewarding countries that do not recognize Taiwan as an independent 
country (Taylor 1998; Brautigam 2008).
26 However, despite the One-China principle, China 
does provide  aid  to  countries  that  recognize  Taiwan  (see  also  Davies 2007). African  aid 
recipients  supported  Chinese  efforts  to  prevent  sanctioning  its  human  rights  record  in 
international fora such as the UN Commission of Human Rights (Lammers 2007; Lancaster 
2007).
27 China expects African countries to gain in political weight in such organizations and 
seems determined to increase their voice in them (Taylor 1998). According to Tull (2006: 
460), China tries “to build coalitions to shield Beijing from Western criticism.” As pointed 
out by Ramo (2004), China has used aid to accumulate sufficient “asymmetric power” in 
order to challenge the United States as the dominant world power and advance the Chinese 
concept of a multipolar world (see also Tull 2006; Kennedy 2010). 
Given that our data vary over time, we can evaluate whether, and to what extent, the 
Chinese aid allocation shows (the expected) different patterns over the five phases outlined 
above. In summary, we expect the  first phase (1956-69) to be dominated by political and 
ideological  considerations.  The  second  phase  (1970-78)  should  equally  be  dominated  by 
political motives, while economic motives should become more relevant in the third phase 
(1979-89). In search for support after the Tiananmen Square massacre, political clout should 
dominate again  in the  fourth phase (1990-95), while  commercial and more market-liberal 
considerations should be important for China’s allocation of aid in the  fifth phase (1996-
2006).  In  all  phases,  we  expect  the  non-interference  principle  to  be  reflected  in  China 
neglecting recipient countries’ quality of policies and governance. We expect the allocation of 
Chinese aid to be driven by resource considerations. However, we also expect its aid to take 
account, at least to some degree, of poverty and need in the recipient countries. 
 
                                                 
25 While most researchers focus on Africa, there is less work on China’s aid to Asia. A notable exception is 
Schüller et al. (2010), who exploit detailed data on China’s engagement in Cambodia, among others. 
26 Taiwan also uses aid to reward countries for recognizing it as independent country, sparking “something of a 
bidding war” (Brautigam 2008: 11). Its dollar diplomacy has been successful in maintaining its international 
profile (Taylor 1998). See also Rich (2009) for the connection between foreign aid and diplomatic recognition of 
the two Chinas. 
27 According to Taylor (1998: 451), China is “[a]lways mindful of the fact that the West is in a minority in 
international organisations such as the United Nations, the courting of support from developing nations enabled 
China to successfully resist Western 'hegemonism' at a time when the old bi-polar world was crumbling.” 17 
 
4. Econometric analysis of China’s aid allocation 
4.1 Empirical strategy and data 
To  test  our  hypotheses, we  look  at the  four  types  of  aid  indicators  explained  above and 
estimate  the  share  each  developing  country  receives  of  total  Chinese  aid  allocated  in  a 
particular phase of China’s aid program.
28 More specifically, we analyze (1) the number of 
aid projects compiled from Bartke (1989) and the Ministry of Commerce (1984-2009), (2a) 
aid amounts in US$ from Bartke (1989), (2b) aid amounts in US$ from CIA (1975-1984), 
(2c) aid amounts in US$ from OECD (1987), (3) the number of medical teams dispatched 
from the Ministry of Commerce (1984-2009) and, finally, (4) the amount of food aid supplied 
as collected by the World Food Programme (2011).
29 We estimate the models using Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) with standard errors clustered by recipient country. As 
Santos  Silva  and  Tenreyro  (2006)  argue,  PPML  outperforms  simple  OLS  and  Tobit 
approaches  with  heteroskedasticity  and  many  zero  observations  in  the  data.
30  PPML  is 
frequently used for non-count data in the international economics literature (see Berger and 
Nitsch 2008, Busse et al. 2011, and Egger and Larch 2011, among many others). 
We  estimate  our  models  by  employing  five  cross-sections  rather  than  time-series 
cross-sectional data. Each cross-section corresponds to one of the five phases of China’s aid 
program outlined in the previous section. The reason for estimating cross-sections rather than 
a panel with yearly data is that China’s aid flows are rather volatile from one year to the next 
(see again Figure 6). The variables that we employ below, however, can hardly be assumed to 
explain this volatility. Rather, we expect them to be able to explain the average share of total 
aid that a particular country receives from China in certain years (see also Gupta et al. 2006). 
Given that we are interested in the differential effects of the explanatory variables over time, 
we  do not pool the cross-sections either, but allow the coefficients of all  variables to  be 
different in each cross-section. This choice is supported by a test for equality in coefficients, 
at the one percent level of significance. The test thus clearly indicates that pooling would not 
be appropriate.
31 For each aid indicator, we thus estimate the following equation: 
    ℎ      = exp	 (   
′   )    
                                                 
28 We use the share in the overall aid budget to be able to compare marginal effects over time, even when the 
average size of China’s aid projects changes over time and when focusing on periods that cover a different 
number of years. We restrict our analysis to recipient countries that are on the DAC List of ODA Recipients as 
of  January  1,  2006  (available  at:  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/34/37954893.pdf,  accessed  February  14, 
2011). 
29 We include all three measures of aid amounts in US$ since we have no a priori belief which data source is best 
suited. The correlation between the three measures is 75.4% (Bartke-CIA), 77.1% (Bartke-OECD) and 80.3% 
(CIA-OECD), respectively. 
30 Zero aid shares are prevalent in our data – in particular in earlier years (see Appendix D). 
31 For this test, we used our baseline specification in column 1 of Table 1. 18 
 
where      ℎ      is the  share of China’s  total  aid  that country    receives  in phase    of 
China’s aid program; xit is a vector containing a set of explanatory variables (including a 
constant) interacted with a set of period dummies;    is a vector of unknown period-specific 
parameters; and     is stochastic term with unit conditional mean. 
In  line with the previous literature on aid  allocation,  we include a set of possible 
determinants as explanatory variables (e.g., Dreher et al. 2011). Note that all these variables 
are averaged over the respective time period under consideration. Assuming that ‘new’ donors 
such as China are more likely to give aid to countries that are geographically closer to them, 
we account for the (logged) distance between the recipient and the donor country.
32 
We control for (logged) population of recipient countries in order to control for the 
size of a recipient country. Larger countries need more resources to develop. Given that our 
dependent  variable  is not in per-capita terms, we  expect  aid to  rise with population. The 
logged per-capita GDP is a commonly used indicator of recipient need, which has repeatedly 
been shown to shape the distribution of aid. In line with China’s official objectives quoted 
above, we expect the effects of per-capita GDP to be significantly negative in our regressions. 
As a further proxy for recipient need, we use the (logged) total number of people affected by a 
natural disaster in the recipient country. 
Our primary measure for  merit is a dummy for democracy coded  as 1 if multiple 
parties are legally allowed and exist outside the regime front, as well as if the selection of the 
executive and the legislature involve an either direct or indirect mandate from an electorate 
(Cheibub et al. 2010). Moreover, in order to qualify as a democracy, incumbents must not be 
able to unconstitutionally close the lower house of the legislature and rewrite the rules in their 
favor.  Following  China’s  non-interference  principle,  we  expect  this  variable  to  be 
insignificant. 
To proxy donors’ political self-interests, the literature suggests a recipient country’s 
voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Various empirical studies 
show that developing countries get more aid and better conditions from donors when they 
have  closer  political  ties  with  the  donor,  as  measured  by  their  UNGA  voting  alignment 
(Thacker 1999; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Barro and Lee 2005; Kilby 2009a, 2010, 2011). 
Relying on data from Kilby (2009b),
33 we calculate the number of times a country votes in 
line with China (either both voting yes, both voting no, both voting abstentions, or both being 
                                                 
32 For example, Harmer and Cotterrell (2005) find that humanitarian aid by non-DAC donors is concentrated in 
neighboring  countries. See also Dreher et al. (2011). In our dataset, bilateral distances are computed as the 
average of the distance between the major cities of the two countries, which are weighted by the share of the city 
in the overall population, as defined in Mayer and Zignago (2006). 
33 We thank Christopher Kilby for sharing his revision of Voeten and Merdzanovic’s (2009) UNGA data. 19 
 
absent). We then divide by the total number of votes in a particular year to derive a measure 
of  voting  coincidence  between  zero  and  one.  In  the  1996-2005  period,  average  voting 
compliance  of  developing  countries  with  China  ranges  from  42.1%  (Palau)  to  92.2% 
(Indonesia). Since China's seat in all UN bodies was held by Taiwan (Republic of China) until 
1971, we make use of voting alignment with Taiwan for the years up to 1971. While we 
expect that countries voting in line  with China  in the UNGA receive more  aid, countries 
voting in line with Taiwan are expected to obtain less aid from China.
34 
An  important political factor driving China’s  aid allocation decisions might be the 
recipient country’s adherence to the One-China policy. A country cannot maintain diplomatic 
relations with both Chinas. While 169 countries recognized the People’s Republic of China in 
2008, only 23 countries had established diplomatic relations with Taiwan at that time.
35 We 
make use of a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country has diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan for six months or more in a particular year (Rich 2009).
36 
To  account  for  commercial  interests,  we  include  China’s  (log)  total  exports  to  a 
particular  recipient  country  in  constant  US$  as  well  as  a  recipient  country’s  (log)  oil 
production in millions of barrels per day. While the former variable intends to capture the idea 
that China might use its foreign aid program as a tool for export promotion, with the latter 
variable we intend to test our hypothesis that aid is employed to secure China’s access to 
natural resources. All variables with their definitions and sources are provided in Appendix A. 
Appendix B shows descriptive statistics. 
As evident from our regression equation, we use contemporaneous values of these 
explanatory variables to explain China’s aid shares attributed to developing countries. This 
may raise some endogeneity concerns. For example, China may not only reward countries 
that have voted in line with it in the UNGA, but countries may also vote in line after receiving 
aid  from  China  in  the  first  place.  Similarly,  China  might  not  only  provide  more  aid  to 
countries with deep commercial ties, but ties might also intensify as a consequence of aid 
flows. A natural solution is the use of lagged values of our explanatory variables, i.e., the 
corresponding  values  before  the  onset  of  the  respective  phase  of  China’s  aid  program. 
However,  such  an  approach  leads  to  some  pitfalls.  First,  these  past  values  seem  to  be 
decoupled from the actual aid allocations. In the most extreme case, explanatory variables in 
1995 would be assumed to explain aid allocations in 2006. Second, bilateral relations need to 
                                                 
34 Therefore, the variable takes the value of 1 minus the voting alignment with Taiwan until 1971. 
35 Bhutan had no diplomatic relations with either of them. 
36 We thank Timothy Rich for providing the data. He constructed the variable from an analysis of the written 
record and data provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's 
Republic of China. 20 
 
be in good shape at the moment when the aid money was disbursed or an aid project was 
completed. This is of particular importance as China’s aid has been suspended in many cases 
after a deterioration of diplomatic relations with recipients (see Bartke 1989 for a discussion). 
Beyond that, the question of timing is not central to our research, which aims to examine 
whether  and  to  which  extent  political  and  commercial  interests  matter  for  China’s  aid 
allocation rather than whether aid is used to bribe or reward the countries. 
 
4.2 China’s project aid 
The results are shown  in Table  1.  We run  nested regressions  for  all periods, rather  than 
performing  regressions  for  each  phase  and  comparing  the  individual  results.  Pooling  the 
phases  enables  us  to  statistically  test  for  differences  and  similarities  among  them.  Note 
however, that we introduce dummies for each individual phase; we interact these dummies 
with our explanatory  variables, mirroring individual regressions for  the individual phases. 
Table 1 reports the marginal effects of all explanatory variables in each of the five phases. We 
also report the p-values of a Wald test for differences in the coefficient of a variable for a 
particular  phase  with  respect  to  the  most  recent  phase  for  which  data  are  available  (in 
brackets).
37 As suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we run a heteroskedasticity-
robust RESET test to test for the adequacy of our models. The corresponding p-values shown 
in  Table  1  indicate  that  all  six models pass  the  RESET test  at  the  five  percent  level  of 
significance.
38 
In column 1, we focus on the share of aid projects, based on 528 observations. As can 
be seen here, the share of projects a country receives is not related to its distance from China, 
at conventional levels of significance. The exception is the fourth phase (1990-95), where the 
share of projects increases with distance. However, the effect is only significant at the ten 
percent level. With respect to the fifth phase, distance matters more in the fourth, also at the 
ten percent level. Overall, there is no evidence that China gives more aid to countries that are 
geographically closer, which is contrary to the results in Dreher et al. (2011) for non-DAC 
donors (excluding China). China, having global ambitions, seems to behave differently than 
the other (smaller) emerging donors. 
   
                                                 
37 Note that comparisons of the first three phases with phase 5 need to be interpreted with caution as we draw 
data from two different data sources. 
38 At the ten percent level, the estimation based on aid data from the CIA does not pass the test, while the other 
regressions do. 21 
 
Table 1: Five Phases of China’s aid program 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
                     Aid projects Aid amount Aid amount Aid amount MedTeams Food aid
(Bartke/CCY) (Bartke) (CIA) (OECD) (CCY) (FAIS)
Distance
1st phase       -0.073          -2.287**        -1.976**                                                 
  (1956-1969)       (0.23)          (2.19)          (2.25)                                                   
      [0.846]          [0.039]           [0.033]   
2nd phase       -0.252          -0.087          -0.013          -0.053                                   
  (1970-1978)       (1.51)          (0.93)          (0.08)          (0.24)                                   
      [0.233]           [0.925]          [0.377]          [0.432]   
3rd phase        0.192          -0.050          -0.233           0.245           0.774*                  
  (1979-1989)       (0.98)          (0.15)          (0.96)          (0.93)          (1.79)                   
      [0.325]                                                          [0.612]   
4th phase        0.413*                                                          0.927**        -0.048   
  (1990-1995)       (1.95)                                                          (2.45)          (0.32)   
      [0.051]                                                                           [0.741]   
5th phase       -0.009                                                                           0.002   
  (1996-2006)       (0.06)                                                                          (0.93)   
Population
1st phase       -0.156          -0.805*         -0.436                                                   
  (1956-1969)       (0.80)          (1.72)          (1.35)                                                   
      [0.474]          [0.094]          [0.059]                                                   
2nd phase       -0.024          -0.042          -0.016           0.027                                   
  (1970-1978)       (0.51)          (1.21)          (0.35)          (0.39)                                   
      [0.003]          [0.765]          [0.148]          [0.461]   
3rd phase        0.002          -0.006           0.262           0.168          -0.109                   
  (1979-1989)       (0.02)          (0.05)          (1.47)          (0.92)          (0.87)                   
      [0.005]                                                          [0.166]   
4th phase       -0.172*                                                         -0.265*         -0.058   
  (1990-1995)       (1.85)                                                          (1.76)          (1.23)   
      [0.222]                                                                          [0.234]   
5th phase       -0.308***                                                                       -0.002   
  (1996-2006)       (3.72)                                                                          (1.46)   
GDP per capita
1st phase       -0.132          -0.633          -0.496                                                   
  (1956-1969)       (0.61)          (0.73)          (0.77)                                                   
      [0.096]          [0.525]          [0.593]   
2nd phase       -0.209*         -0.189**        -0.119          -0.233                                   
  (1970-1978)       (1.84)          (2.56)          (1.16)          (1.49)                                   
      [0.036]          [0.591]          [0.934]          [0.656]   
3rd phase       -0.328***       -0.094          -0.141          -0.121          -0.523***                
  (1979-1989)       (2.75)          (0.54)          (0.55)          (0.58)          (2.74)                   
      [0.216]                                                          [0.046]   
4th phase       -0.439***                                                       -0.743***       -0.102   
  (1990-1995)       (3.16)                                                          (4.81)          (0.99)   
      [0.528]                                                                          [0.363]   
5th phase       -0.528***                                                                       -0.008** 
  (1996-2006)       (4.65)                                                                          (2.33)   
Disaster
1st phase        0.014          -0.007          -0.072                                                   
  (1956-1969)       (0.72)          (0.08)          (1.44)                                                   
      [0.381]          [0.923]          [0.346]   
2nd phase        0.009           0.030***        0.047***        0.055***                                
  (1970-1978)       (0.65)          (3.01)          (3.13)          (3.56)                                   
      [0.244]          [0.496]           [0.040]          [0.499]   
3rd phase        0.030           0.002          -0.018           0.031          -0.031                   
  (1979-1989)       (1.63)          (0.04)          (0.65)          (1.03)          (1.42)                   
       [0.640]                                                          [0.159]   
4th phase       -0.010                                                           0.009           0.017   
  (1990-1995)       (0.43)                                                          (0.23)          (0.64)   
      [0.134]                                                                          [0.528]   
5th phase        0.048                                                                           0.000   
  (1996-2006)       (1.54)                                                                          (0.07)   
Democracy
1st phase        0.016          -0.672          -0.587                                                   
  (1956-1969)       (0.09)          (0.93)          (1.04)                                                   
      [0.743]          [0.983]          [0.437]   
2nd phase       -0.112           0.079           0.157           0.039                                   
  (1970-1978)       (0.47)          (0.47)          (0.79)          (0.12)                                   
      [0.844]          [0.087]          [0.101]          [0.092]   
3rd phase       -1.166**        -0.691          -1.374          -1.626*         -2.035                   
  (1979-1989)       (2.56)          (1.55)          (1.49)          (1.70)          (1.64)                   
      [0.021]                                                          [0.454]   
4th phase        0.128                                                          -1.266**        -0.210   
  (1990-1995)       (0.68)                                                          (2.03)          (0.77)   
      [0.375]                                                                          [0.439]   
5th phase       -0.059                                                                           0.002   
  (1996-2006)       (0.38)                                                                          (1.11)   22 
 
Table 1 (continued): Five Phases of China’s aid program 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
                     Aid projects Aid amount Aid amount Aid amount MedTeams Food aid
(Bartke/CCY) (Bartke) (CIA) (OECD) (CCY) (FAIS)
Taiwan recognition
1st phase       -1.288          -5.432*         -4.743*                                                  
  (1956-1969)       (0.88)          (1.79)          (1.76)                                                   
      [0.068]          [0.006]          [0.031]   
2nd phase        0.077          -0.039           0.029          -0.600                                   
  (1970-1978)       (0.26)          (0.17)          (0.12)          (0.85)                                   
      [0.000]           [0.000]          [0.014]          [0.520]   
3rd phase      -23.133***      -26.450***      -46.279**        -1.483          -2.941**                 
  (1979-1989)       (5.30)          (3.87)          (2.46)          (1.24)          (2.29)                   
      [0.000]                                                          [0.543]   
4th phase       -2.400***                                                       -2.094**         0.167   
  (1990-1995)       (3.51)                                                          (2.44)          (0.75)   
      [0.060]                                                                          [0.446]   
5th phase       -4.750***                                                                       -0.002   
  (1996-2006)       (3.80)                                                                          (0.62)   
UNGA voting
1st phase        5.227*          3.616           3.842                                                   
  (1956-1969)       (1.78)          (0.66)          (0.94)                                                   
      [0.139]          [0.821]          [0.996]   
2nd phase        7.438***        6.661***        7.875***        6.051**                                 
  (1970-1978)       (4.28)          (4.10)          (4.08)          (2.35)                                   
      [0.001]          [0.743]          [0.441]          [0.903]   
3rd phase        5.598**         5.181           3.871           5.454           9.113**                 
  (1979-1989)       (2.20)          (1.25)          (0.84)          (1.26)          (2.29)                   
      [0.044]                                                          [0.187]   
4th phase        3.571***                                                        4.570***        1.083   
  (1990-1995)       (2.86)                                                          (2.90)          (1.24)   
      [0.048]                                                                          [0.215]   
5th phase        0.665                                                                           0.004   
  (1996-2006)       (0.67)                                                                          (0.42)   
Exports
1st phase       -0.023           0.075           0.083                                                   
  (1956-1969)       (1.39)          (1.00)          (1.16)                                                   
      [0.010]          [0.747]          [0.191]   
2nd phase       -0.002           0.027           0.019           0.024                                   
  (1970-1978)       (0.14)          (1.51)          (0.78)          (0.72)                                   
      [0.018]          [0.409]          [0.377]          [0.820]   
3rd phase        0.111**         0.118          -0.038           0.038           0.085                   
  (1979-1989)       (1.97)          (1.08)          (0.61)          (0.64)          (0.91)                   
      [0.593]                                                          [0.843]   
4th phase        0.073                                                           0.067           0.026   
  (1990-1995)       (1.06)                                                          (0.89)          (0.80)   
      [0.353]                                                                          [0.466]   
5th phase        0.157**                                                                         0.002   
  (1996-2006)       (2.33)                                                                          (1.42)   
Oil production
1st phase        0.017           0.104           0.082                                                   
  (1956-1969)       (0.70)          (1.26)          (1.32)                                                   
      [0.210]          [0.079]          [0.133]   
2nd phase       -0.017           0.004          -0.012          -0.033                                   
  (1970-1978)       (0.99)          (0.41)          (0.66)          (1.04)                                   
      [0.980]          [0.170]          [0.814]          [0.400]   
3rd phase       -0.052**        -0.039          -0.025          -0.084           0.075*                  
  (1979-1989)       (2.54)          (1.23)          (0.47)          (1.52)          (1.94)                   
      [0.163]                                                          [0.366]   
4th phase       -0.011                                                           0.100**        -0.048   
  (1990-1995)       (0.53)                                                          (2.23)          (1.60)   
      [0.782]                                                                          [0.113]   
5th phase       -0.018                                                                          -0.000   
  (1996-2006)       (0.97)                                                                          (0.93)   
# observations 528 267 260 205 240 261
# countries 132 105 101 107 128 132
Log pseudolikelihood -471.912 -277.096 -277.096 -228.180 -267.580 -202.717
Wald chi2 (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RESET test (p value) 0.536 0.267 0.078 0.630 0.689 0.908
Notes:
- Estimation technique: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) with standard errors clustered by recipient country
- All regressions include time period dummies and all explanatory variables are interacted with these dummies
- We report marginal effects of the explanatory variables (corresponding z-values in parentheses)
- In brackets: p-values of a Wald test of equal marginal effects of the respective period compared to the last period on which data are available
- * (**, ***) indicates significance at the ten (five, one) percent level
- Datasets do not necessarily cover all years of the respective phase of China's aid program (see Section 2 and Appendix A)23 
 
Regarding population size, we find no significant effects on the share of aid projects a country 
receives in the first three phases. Only since the 1990s do we find that larger countries receive 
fewer projects, at the ten percent level between 1990-1995 (phase 4), and at the one percent 
level in the 1996-2005 period (phase 5). Given that our dependent variable is not in per-capita 
terms, this result is surprising. Compared to the fifth period, we find that population was 
significantly less important for China’s decision to grant aid in the second and third period, at 
the one percent level of significance. 
Turning to per-capita income, we find that recipient need is important for China’s 
allocation of aid.  Specifically, a  country’s share of aid projects decreases with per-capita 
GDP, the effect being statistically significant at conventional levels in phases 2-5. The results 
also show that the  importance of recipient income for China’s aid allocation increased in 
magnitude with time. At the mean of the continuous explanatory variables (and setting the 
dummies to zero), an increase in per-capita GDP by 10 percent reduces a country’s share in 
China’s aid projects by 0.020 percentage points in phase 2 (0.209*log(1.1)), 0.031 in phase 3, 
0.042 in phase 4, and 0.050 in phase 5. With respect to the fifth phase, the marginal effects in 
the first two phases are significantly smaller at conventional levels. Our evidence is thus in 
line with CIA (1980) and Brautigam (2008), who stress that China’s allocation of aid does 
focus on  the  need  of  developing  countries. Controlling  for  per-capita  GDP  however,  the 
second  need-related  variable  in  the  model  –  natural  disasters  –  is  not  significant  at 
conventional levels in any phase. Apparently, China’s project aid does not react to short-term 
disasters, but rather focuses on the overall level of development.
39 
Column 1 confirms that Chinese aid is largely unrelated to the recipient countries’ 
degree of democracy, in line with our hypothesis presented above. Only in the third phase is 
democracy significant in explaining the allocation of China’s aid projects, with a negative 
marginal effect. Rather than rewarding more democratic countries, China provides less aid to 
more democratic countries in the 1979-1987 period, at the five percent level of significance. 
Quantitatively, the share of China’s aid budget a democracy receives is 1.2 percentage points 
lower compared to non-democracies. This is in line with Taylor (1998), stressing China’s 
enthusiastic  opposition  to  democratization  in  Africa  at  a  time  when  demands  for  more 
democracy became prevalent in China.
40 
                                                 
39 Note that China’s disaster relief is not administered by the Ministry of Commerce, but by the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (Kobayasi 2008). 
40 We test for the robustness of these results by substituting the democracy index with six alternative measures of 
governance and institutions in Section 5. 24 
 
The results show that recognition of Taiwan is clearly important for a country’s aid 
share in most periods. At the one percent level of significance, countries recognizing Taiwan 
have received less aid since the 1979-1987 period.
41 Quantitatively, the impact of recognition 
is more important in the third phase, and less important in the fourth phase, when compared to 
the fifth. Holding all other variables constant, the share of China’s aid projects to countries 
recognizing Taiwan is 4.8 percentage points lower in the fifth phase, and 23.1 percentage 
points lower in the third phase than for countries that entertain diplomatic relations with the 
People’s Republic instead. 
Our  second  proxy  for  political  interests  is  a  country’s  voting  behavior  in the  UN 
General Assembly. As can be seen, voting is important. In all phases, countries voting in line 
with China (or voting against Taiwan up to 1971) receive a larger aid share. The marginal 
effect is statistically significant at conventional levels with the exception of the most recent 
phase (1996-2005).
42 The quantitative impact of voting is sizeable. In the 1956-1969 period a 
country changing its voting behavior from zero to one (i.e., from always voting with Taiwan 
to never) receives an aid share that is 5.2 percentage points higher. The impact increases to 
7.4 in the second period, but decreases thereafter. In phases 2-4, the impact of voting was 
significantly more important compared to the fifth phase, at least at the five percent level. 
There is thus strong evidence that Chinese aid supports its allies, in line with Naím (2007). 
While we do not find empirical support for the idea that political considerations became more 
important in the period after the Tiananmen incident, our results confirm our expectations that 
voting with the UNGA is of less importance in the fifth phase. Taking the results for both 
political variables together, our empirical evidence suggests that political factors have been 
important drivers of China’s aid allocation decisions across all phases of its aid program. 
Finally, we look at whether or not commercial motives are important for China’s aid 
allocation. The results are mixed here. We find a significant impact of a recipient country’s 
exports to China only in two of the five phases. However, these are the two periods, in which 
we expected commercial interests to be predominant. Specifically, a recipient country’s aid 
share increases with its bilateral exports in the 1979-1987 period (phase 3), the period of 
Deng Xioping’s “Reform and Opening Up,” and the 1996-2005 period (phase 5), the period 
after the aid reform of 1995 that emphasized the linkages between aid, trade and investment. 
In quantitative terms, an increase  in exports by  10 percent increases a  country’s share in 
                                                 
41 When we exclude the other variable for political motives, UNGA voting alignment, from the regression, the 
effect of the recognition of Taiwan becomes statistically significant from the second phase (results available 
upon request). 
42 Note that the effect of UNGA voting alignment becomes statistically significant at the five percent level in the 
fifth phase when we drop the Taiwan recognition variable from our regression (results available on request). 25 
 
China’s  aid  projects  by  0.011  percentage  points  in  phase  3  (0.111*log(1.1))  and  0.015 
percentage points in phase 5.
43 Nevertheless, given the perceptions about China granting aid 
for predominantly commercial reasons, this is a surprisingly low effect. This impression is 
strengthened by looking at the results for oil production. In only one phase do we observe a 
significant effect (phase 3). However, the marginal effect is negative rather than positive (at 
the  five  percent  level).  The  expectation  that  China  is  a  resource-hungry  donor,  granting 




4.3 Total aid money, medical teams and food aid 
Columns 2-6 replicate the analysis employing our alternative dependent variables. The results 
are in line with those of column 1 to some extent. With respect to the share of the aid amount 
a country receives, distance hardly seems to matter. Using the data obtained from Bartke 
(column 2) and the CIA (column 3), we find that more distant countries received significantly 
less aid in the first phase, but not thereafter. This seems to reflect that China was a small 
donor in its early years, thus focusing on its neighbors, as is the case for many new donors in 
recent years (Dreher et al. 2011). Using the OECD data (column 4), the coefficients are not 
significant at conventional levels for the two phases these data are available. The same holds 
for food aid (column 6). The exception is medical teams. As can be seen in column 5, more 
teams  go to  countries that are  further away.  Population  is not significant at conventional 
levels in most regressions, with two exceptions where the coefficient is again negative. 
Regarding the need orientation of China’s total aid amount, we find that more aid 
money goes to poorer countries in only one of the specifications (phase 2, column 2). While 
the  other  marginal  effects  are  all  negative  (as  expected),  they  are  not  significant  at 
conventional levels. Moreover, fewer medical teams are sent to richer countries (statistically 
significant at conventional levels in the third and fourth phase – see column 5), and richer 
countries also receive less food aid (significant in the fifth phase – column 6). According to 
columns 2-4, countries hit by more disasters receive larger aid amounts in the second phase, 
at the one percent level of significance. However, disasters do not seem to matter for the 
                                                 
43 When replacing bilateral exports by bilateral trade, i.e., exports plus imports, the marginal effects in these two 
phases are again positive, and even significant at the one percent level. However, bilateral imports to China 
alone do not turn out to be statistically significant in any of the five phases of China’s aid program (results 
available upon request). 
44 We test for the robustness of these results by substituting the oil production  variable with 15 alternative 
measures of natural resources in Section 5. 26 
 
allocation  of  medical  teams  and  food  aid,  both  being  aid  types  that  are  expected  to  be 
particularly responsive to these catastrophes. 
The results for democracy are similar to those reported for column 1 above. In phase 
3, more democratic countries receive less money, with marginal effects being significant at 
the  ten percent level  or  slightly  below. Similarly,  fewer  medical  teams  are  dispatched to 
democracies than to autocracies in the 1990-1995 period (phase 4). 
Turning to political motives, both the recognition of Taiwan and UNGA voting are 
again  important  determinants  of  China’s  allocation  of  aid.  In  all  phases  of  China’s  aid 
program, there is strong evidence that politics play an important role in the allocation of aid 
money and medical teams to recipient countries. Only the allocation of food aid does not 
appear to be shaped by political motivations. With respect to commercial interests, we again 
find only weak evidence that they drive aid allocation decisions. In particular, there is no 
evidence that the allocation of aid amounts, medical teams and food aid is used as a tool for 
export  promotion.  All  of  these  respective  effects  are  not  statistically  significant  at 
conventional levels. With the exception of medical teams dispatched, we find no evidence 
that  China’s  aid  allocation  is  guided  by  natural  resource  endowments.  An  increase  of  a 
recipient’s  oil  production  by  10%  is  found  to  increase  this  country’s  share  in  receiving 
China’s medical teams  by 0.007 in the  third phase and by 0.010 in the fourth phase, the 
marginal effects being statistically significant at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
In  summary,  we  did not find  much  evidence  that  China  ignores  recipient  need  as 
claimed by its critics when deciding on its aid allocation. Nor did we find strong evidence that 
commercial interests matter or that recipient countries with bad governance are favored.
45 
However, we did find that politics are important in all five phases of China’s aid program. 
While some of the more extreme concerns regarding China’s allocation of aid seem to be 
exaggerated (‘rogue aid’), to some extent, China’s critics might be right. To the extent that 
other donors reward democratic countries with more aid, the availability of aid from China 
could undermine the effectiveness of other countries’ aid. Even if recipient need is important 
for Chinese aid allocation, it could well be that the elasticity of aid to income is substantially 
lower compared to those of other countries. On the contrary, while we found that politics are 
important,  it  might  well  be  that  aid  from  other  countries  reacts  even  more  to  political 
considerations, in line with evidence reported by Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Kuziemko 
                                                 
45 Note that our main conclusions hold when we use OLS instead of the PPML approach (results available on 
request).  Our  finding  that  there  is  only  mixed  evidence  for  commercial  interests  in  China’s  aid  allocation 
decisions is further strengthened by these results: The positive effect of exports on aid projects in the fifth period 
(1996-2005) loses its statistical significance at conventional levels in the OLS setting. 27 
 
and Werker (2006). In order to assess these questions, we need to compare the allocation of 
China’s aid with those of other donors. This is what we turn to next. 
 
5. Comparison with DAC and other emerging donors 
In order to study whether China’s aid is really different, Tables 2-4 compare China’s aid 
allocation decisions in the 1996-2005 period with those of the DAC donor countries, as well 
as emerging donors. First, we compare China’s aid allocation to that of the United States, 
Japan, and the average of the three biggest EU countries (Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom).  Second,  Chinese  aid  allocation  is  compared  to  the  so-called  ‘good  donors’ 
(Denmark,  Netherlands,  Norway  and  Sweden),  which  are  widely  expected  to  provide 
development  aid predominantly  based on  humanitarian  motives.  Finally,  comparisons  are 
made with Korea, another large emerging Asian donor, and with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
two Arab non-DAC donors with sizeable aid budgets. Since no information on aid amounts 
allocated to recipient countries is available for China since the mid-1980s, we rely on the 
number of aid projects completed under China’s aid program and construct a comparable 
variable for our benchmark countries.
46 
Unfortunately, no direct information on the annual number of aid projects completed 
is available for the benchmark countries. Therefore, we construct such a  variable  in three 
different  ways,  using  data  from  the  project-level  aid  database  AidData.
47  First,  we  use 
information on the  projected completion date at the time of the commitment of each aid 
project  to derive the  year  of completion. Second, we  estimate the  year  of completion by 
taking the mean duration of all projects of a particular country as this entry is missing for 
earlier years for some countries. Third, since the entry of the year of completion is entirely 
missing for some countries, we estimate the year of completion for these countries by taking 
the  average  of  the  estimated  mean  duration of  all countries.  Since  the  correlation  of  the 
resulting three variables is very high for those countries for which we can construct all three 
measures, we take the coarsest proxy variable that is based on the single estimated average 
project duration for all countries and is hence available for all donor countries.
48 Finally, in 
order to  increase the comparability of our variable  with the Chinese data,  we restrict the 
                                                 
46 Given that the amounts of China’s aid are not directly comparable to Western aid, as outlined above, the focus 
on the number of projects is preferable. This comes at the disadvantage that projects of different size are treated 
the same. Focusing on the number or existence of projects rather than or in addition to investigating amounts of 
aid is standard in the aid allocation literature (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009a, b). 
47 Data are available online at http://www.aiddata.org/research/releases. 
48 The correlation between the direct measure and the coarsest proxy ranges between 94.62 (United Kingdom) 
and 99.43 (Korea). 28 
 




Table 2: Comparison of China’s aid allocation with DAC donors and other emerging donors 
(1996-2005): Baseline regression 
 
 
We again run nested regressions. So that we can test for differences in the effects of the 
individual variables on the different donors, we include all donors rather than performing 
regressions for each individual donor and comparing the individual results. In Table 2, we use 
the  same  explanatory  variables  as  in  Table  1  above.  The  RESET  test  statistic  is  not 
statistically  significant at  conventional  levels,  i.e.,  there  is  no  evidence  that our  model  is 
misspecified. As can be seen, distance matters for all countries except China and the United 
States.  However,  while  the  EU-3  and  the  ‘good  donors’  give  a  larger  share  of  their  aid 
projects  to  more  distant  countries,  Japan,  Korea  and  the  Arab  donors  focus  instead  on 
countries that are less distant. This is in line with the observation that ‘new’ donors focus on 
their own region (e.g., Dreher et al. 2011). The obvious exception to this rule is China, and 
the differences in coefficients are significant at the ten percent level at least, for all ‘new’ 
donors (again indicated by the Wald tests in brackets). 
                                                 
49 The sectors included are the following (DAC purpose codes in parentheses): Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
(311,  312,  313),  communications  (220),  education  (111,  112,  113,  114),  energy  (230),  health  (121,  122), 
industry, mining, construction (321, 322, 323), other multisector (430), other social infrastructure and services 
(160), transport and storage (210), water supply and sanitation (140). 
                     Distance Population GDP p. c. Disaster Democracy Taiwan rec. UNGA voting Exports Oil prod.
China                      -0.009          -0.308***       -0.528***        0.048          -0.059          -4.750***        0.665           0.157**        -0.018   
                           (0.06)          (3.72)          (4.65)          (1.54)          (0.38)          (3.80)          (0.67)          (2.33)          (0.97)   
USA                      -0.166           0.152**        -0.150**         0.013          -0.039           0.013           1.256*          0.112***       -0.024** 
                           (1.35)          (2.44)          (2.18)          (0.44)          (0.35)          (0.10)          (1.95)          (2.60)          (2.21)   
      [0.387]          [0.000]          [0.002]          [0.349]          [0.905]          [0.000]          [0.628]          [0.515]          [0.755]   
EU-3                       0.114**         0.076**        -0.119**         0.027**         0.005           0.000          -0.017           0.151***       -0.026***
                           (1.99)          (2.40)          (2.56)          (2.08)          (0.08)          (0.00)          (0.03)          (5.32)          (4.37)   
      [0.406]          [0.000]          [0.000]          [0.487]          [0.693]          [0.000]          [0.539]          [0.926]          [0.637]   
'Good donors'                     0.321**         0.135**        -0.139**         0.058          -0.260*          0.058           1.853**         0.088***       -0.039***
                           (2.49)          (2.18)          (2.19)          (1.64)          (1.66)          (0.41)          (2.14)          (3.11)          (2.65)   
      [0.051]          [0.000]          [0.002]          [0.831]          [0.324]          [0.000]          [0.347]          [0.330]          [0.364]   
Japan                      -0.305***        0.030          -0.060           0.031**        -0.011           0.156***        1.508***        0.085***       -0.010   
                           (4.83)          (0.86)          (1.21)          (2.08)          (0.19)          (2.69)          (2.64)          (3.23)          (1.50)   
      [0.051]          [0.000]          [0.000]          [0.601]          [0.761]          [0.000]          [0.459]          [0.301]          [0.670]   
Korea                      -0.479***        0.022          -0.058           0.001          -0.065           0.165           1.249           0.044           0.010   
                           (5.84)          (0.71)          (1.07)          (0.11)          (0.87)          (1.46)          (1.21)          (1.43)          (0.90)   
      [0.002]          [0.000]          [0.000]          [0.155]          [0.974]          [0.000]          [0.653]          [0.108]          [0.158]   
Arab donors                      -0.356***        0.040          -0.096          -0.046**        -0.043           0.326***        3.476***        0.012          -0.030*  
                           (4.49)          (0.90)          (1.64)          (2.39)          (0.28)          (3.13)          (3.70)          (1.41)          (1.65)   




Wald chi2 (p value)
RESET test (p value)
Notes:
- Estimation technique: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) with standard errors clustered by recipient country
- Dependent variable: Number of aid projects completed in recipient country (% of total number of aid projects provided by donor), 1995-2005
- The regression includes donor (group) dummies and all explanatory variables are interacted with these dummies
- We report marginal effects of the explanatory variables (corresponding z-values in parentheses)
- In brackets: p-values of a Wald test of equal marginal effects of the respective donor (group) compared to China
- * (**, ***) indicates significance at the ten (five, one) percent level
       0.851   
        1686   
         132   
   -1491.759   
       0.000   29 
 
With respect to population, the United States, the EU-3, and the ‘good donors’ give a 
larger share of their projects to more populous countries, as expected. Regarding recipient 
income, this same group of countries gives more aid to poorer countries, at the five percent 
level of significance, while GDP per capita has no significant impact on the aid allocation of 
Japan, Korea and the Arab donors. Surprisingly however, the marginal effect of (log) per-
capita GDP in the regression for China exceeds those of the other donors by a factor of at 
least 3. These differences are significant at the one percent level throughout. Consequently, 
rather than ignoring recipient need in its allocation of aid, China shows the strongest concern 
for recipient income among the sample of donors we investigate, with a marginal effect even 
larger than that for the ‘good donors’. However, these positive results with respect to recipient 
need are mitigated through the fact that China’s aid shares do not react to population size. 
The  results  also  show  that  few  donors  allocate  significantly  larger  aid  shares  to 
countries  hit  by  disasters.  This  holds  for  the  EU-3  and  Japan  at  the  five  percent  level. 
Surprisingly (also at the five percent level), Arab donors allocate fewer projects to countries 
that experienced catastrophes. Compared to China, the only significant difference holds with 
respect to these Arab donors, with China allocating more aid to countries hit by disasters, at 
the one percent level of significance. Again, there is no evidence that China’s allocation of aid 
is inferior from a humanitarian point of view compared to other donor countries. 
With regard to democracy, only one of the marginal effects turns out to be significant 
at conventional levels. Surprisingly, the ‘good donors’ allocate significantly smaller shares of 
their  aid  projects  to  democracies.  However,  the  difference  to  China  is  not  significant  at 
conventional levels, as is true for the difference between China and any of the other donors 
included here. 
Table 3 tests for the robustness of these results. We report the results for our baseline 
model with the democracy variable in column 1 and show the results of seven alternative 
model specifications in columns 2-8, each time replacing the democracy variable with another 
indicator for institutional quality.
50 First, we use five indicators of governance provided by 
Kaufmann et al. (2009). Voice and accountability refers to the extent to which a country’s 
citizens  can participate in  selecting  their  governments,  as well  as  freedom of expression, 
association  and  the  media.  Political  stability  captures  a  population’s  perception  of  its 
government’s stability. It is the perceived likelihood that the government could be overthrown 
by violent or unconstitutional means. Government effectiveness reflects the quality of the 
                                                 
50 Due to the lack of space, we do not report the results for the other explanatory variables. The full results are 
available on request. 30 
 
administration and of civil servants, and the credibility of a government. It focuses on inputs 
that governments need to produce, and the implementation of sound policies and delivery of 
public  goods.  Regulatory  quality  measures  the  government’s  ability  to  formulate  and 
implement  sound  and  market-friendly  policies  and  regulations.  Finally,  the  control  of 
corruption index is an aggregate measure of the extent of corruption (defined as the exercise 
of  public  power  for  private  gain).
51  Second,  we  use  a  composite  indicator  of  economic 
freedom provided by Gwartney et al. (2009) ranging between 0 and 10, with higher values 
indicating more freedom. Finally, we employ a dummy variable as an indicator of military 
dictatorships (taken from Hsu 2008). 
 
Table 3: Comparison of China’s aid allocation with DAC donors and other emerging donors 
(1996-2005): Institutional quality 
 
 
Columns 1-8 of Table 3 show that China clearly does not take account of institutional quality 
when deciding on its allocation of aid. In none of the regressions does the coefficient of any 
of the governance variables turn out to be significant at conventional levels. Comparing the 
aid allocation of China with that of the other donors, the ‘good donors’ allocate significantly 
more aid to more effective and less corrupt countries, and less aid to military dictatorships. 
                                                 
51 We also did not use the rule of law as it is highly correlated with the control of corruption and government 
effectiveness. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
                     Political Government Regulatory Control of Economic Military
Democracy Voice stability effectiveness quality corruption freedom dictatorship
China                      -0.059          -0.036           0.103          -0.211          -0.037          -0.201          -0.084           0.357   
                           (0.38)          (0.32)          (0.86)          (1.36)          (0.27)          (1.39)          (0.95)          (0.98)   
USA                      -0.039           0.087           0.002           0.085           0.187**        -0.082           0.466***       -0.787** 
                           (0.35)          (1.27)          (0.04)          (0.87)          (2.09)          (0.91)          (3.81)          (2.49)   
      [0.905]          [0.310]          [0.407]          [0.049]          [0.128]          [0.437]          [0.000]          [0.003]   
EU-3                       0.005           0.103***        0.050           0.121**         0.147***        0.016           0.142*         -0.122   
                           (0.08)          (2.78)          (1.38)          (2.12)          (2.66)          (0.29)          (1.88)          (1.14)   
      [0.693]          [0.234]          [0.663]          [0.030]          [0.158]          [0.123]          [0.015]          [0.138]   
'Good donors'                  -0.260*          0.058           0.090           0.252**         0.123           0.127           0.075          -0.804*  
                           (1.66)          (0.69)          (1.25)          (2.32)          (1.27)          (1.41)          (0.51)          (1.90)   
      [0.324]          [0.496]          [0.924]          [0.010]          [0.294]          [0.038]          [0.257]          [0.000]   
Japan                      -0.011           0.011           0.100**         0.153**         0.188***        0.121**         0.120*          0.159   
                           (0.19)          (0.27)          (2.27)          (2.46)          (3.26)          (1.99)          (1.75)          (0.95)   
      [0.761]          [0.688]          [0.985]          [0.026]          [0.097]          [0.035]          [0.015]          [0.601]   
Korea                      -0.065          -0.090**         0.017          -0.101          -0.065          -0.121*         -0.025           0.134   
                           (0.87)          (2.19)          (0.32)          (1.39)          (1.27)          (1.89)          (0.35)          (1.08)   
      [0.974]          [0.643]          [0.495]          [0.502]          [0.837]          [0.590]          [0.556]          [0.558]   
Arab donors                      -0.043          -0.022          -0.117          -0.142          -0.072          -0.115          -0.175***        0.136   
                           (0.28)          (0.22)          (1.20)          (1.13)          (0.83)          (1.21)          (2.79)          (1.07)   
      [0.937]          [0.913]          [0.142]          [0.694]          [0.810]          [0.605]          [0.405]          [0.537]   
# observations         1686            1666            1666            1666            1666            1666            1175            1326   
# countries          132             130             130             130             130             130              91             103   
Log pseudolikelihood    -1491.759       -1490.837       -1488.784       -1481.966       -1486.690       -1488.366       -1136.245       -1233.160   
Wald chi2 (p value)        0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000   
RESET test (p value)        0.851           0.321           0.394           0.702           0.653           0.571           0.872           0.627   
Notes:
- Estimation technique: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) with standard errors clustered by recipient country
- Dependent variable: Number of aid projects completed in recipient country (% of total number of aid projects provided by donor), 1995-2005
- All regressions include donor (group) dummies and all explanatory variables are interacted with these dummies
- All regressions include the same control variables as in Table 2 (Distance, Population, GDP per capita, Disaster, Taiwan recognition, UNGA voting, Exports, and Oil production)
- We report marginal effects of the explanatory variables (corresponding z-values in parentheses)
- In brackets: p-values of a Wald test of equal marginal effects of the respective donor (group) compared to China
- * (**, ***) indicates significance at the ten (five, one) percent levelTable 4: Comparison of China’s aid allocation with DAC donors and other emerging donors (1996-2005): Natural resource endowment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
                     Oil Oil Oil Oil Gas Coal Diamond Energy Mineral Total fuel Total OM Total ARM Bilateral fuel Bilateral OMBilateral ARM Natural
production production dummy reserves production production production depletion depletion exports exports exports imports imports imports capital
China                      -0.018          -0.014          -0.181          -0.016*         -0.020          -0.017           0.003           0.009          -0.005          -0.012          -0.000           0.035           0.005          -0.012           0.040**         0.012   
                           (0.97)          (1.18)          (0.81)          (1.66)          (1.36)          (1.04)          (0.21)          (0.83)          (0.51)          (0.62)          (0.00)          (1.00)          (0.38)          (0.39)          (2.39)          (0.16)   
USA                      -0.024**        -0.010          -0.160          -0.007          -0.009          -0.016*         -0.006          -0.012*          0.001           0.011           0.042**         0.037          -0.029           0.039**         0.001          -0.101*  
                           (2.21)          (1.48)          (1.15)          (1.31)          (1.10)          (1.78)          (0.46)          (1.74)          (0.16)          (0.95)          (2.33)          (1.62)          (1.34)          (2.03)          (0.06)          (1.90)   
      [0.755]          [0.778]          [0.934]          [0.403]          [0.439]          [0.939]          [0.581]          [0.057]          [0.587]          [0.240]          [0.161]          [0.954]          [0.164]          [0.154]          [0.039]          [0.171]   
EU-3                      -0.026***       -0.011***       -0.191**        -0.009***       -0.009**        -0.004           0.004          -0.008**         0.001          -0.006           0.012           0.012          -0.020*          0.020**        -0.003          -0.121***
                           (4.37)          (2.92)          (2.46)          (3.15)          (1.96)          (0.70)          (0.71)          (2.10)          (0.16)          (0.74)          (1.12)          (0.84)          (1.76)          (2.01)          (0.27)          (3.72)   
      [0.637]          [0.820]          [0.967]          [0.489]          [0.417]          [0.365]          [0.920]          [0.114]          [0.568]          [0.741]          [0.652]          [0.499]          [0.147]          [0.279]          [0.020]          [0.070]   
'Good donors'                    -0.039***       -0.020**        -0.390*         -0.015**        -0.015*          0.004           0.016          -0.001           0.001           0.017           0.032*          0.064**        -0.015           0.098           0.005          -0.115   
                           (2.65)          (2.32)          (1.93)          (2.36)          (1.68)          (0.48)          (1.55)          (0.15)          (0.18)          (1.18)          (1.75)          (2.26)          (0.62)          (1.28)          (0.26)          (1.52)   
      [0.364]          [0.672]          [0.487]          [0.953]          [0.728]          [0.145]          [0.387]          [0.369]          [0.561]          [0.190]          [0.314]          [0.437]          [0.467]          [0.178]          [0.170]          [0.139]   
Japan                      -0.010          -0.000           0.006          -0.001          -0.005          -0.003           0.004          -0.008**         0.006*         -0.006           0.026**         0.031**        -0.026           0.015           0.031***       -0.053*  
                           (1.50)          (0.05)          (0.08)          (0.21)          (1.07)          (0.43)          (0.57)          (2.48)          (1.65)          (0.92)          (2.42)          (2.26)          (1.00)          (1.24)          (3.10)          (1.90)   
      [0.670]          [0.267]          [0.419]          [0.130]          [0.281]          [0.375]          [0.954]          [0.080]          [0.256]          [0.759]          [0.338]          [0.915]          [0.280]          [0.388]          [0.646]          [0.399]   
Korea                       0.010           0.010**         0.146***        0.007**         0.011**         0.011**        -0.018          -0.002          -0.000           0.003           0.008           0.030*         -0.035**        -0.007           0.027*         -0.020   
                           (0.90)          (2.25)          (3.05)          (2.21)          (2.14)          (2.35)          (1.64)          (0.38)          (0.05)          (0.35)          (0.75)          (1.67)          (2.10)          (0.32)          (1.77)          (0.41)   
      [0.158]          [0.044]          [0.135]          [0.015]          [0.024]          [0.085]          [0.237]          [0.309]          [0.656]          [0.458]          [0.773]          [0.889]          [0.054]          [0.900]          [0.537]          [0.703]   
Arab donors                      -0.030*         -0.020*         -0.418          -0.016*         -0.010          -0.007           0.002          -0.018          -0.004          -0.007           0.028           0.010          -0.063          -0.045           0.033          -0.073   
                           (1.65)          (1.73)          (1.39)          (1.88)          (0.74)          (0.52)          (0.12)          (1.36)          (0.53)          (0.65)          (0.96)          (0.28)          (1.25)          (1.12)          (1.17)          (1.34)   
      [0.597]          [0.692]          [0.519]          [0.971]          [0.592]          [0.574]          [0.978]          [0.084]          [0.942]          [0.813]          [0.457]          [0.584]          [0.194]          [0.508]          [0.843]          [0.293]   
# observations         1686            1686            1686            1686            1686            1686            1237            1634            1634            1500            1513            1513             633             957            1156    1403
# countries          132             132             132             132             132             132              96             128             128             117             118             118             126             132             132    109
Log pseudolikelihood    -1491.759       -1495.592       -1497.588       -1494.050       -1508.186       -1515.454       -1212.931       -1470.548       -1479.377       -1371.496       -1377.052       -1375.517        -594.265        -917.174       -1071.370    -1278.359
Wald chi2 (p value)        0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000    0.000
RESET test (p value)        0.851           0.622           0.576           0.591           0.322           0.136           0.223           0.206           0.437           0.258           0.251           0.109           0.091           0.370           0.738    0.867
Notes:
- Estimation technique: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) with standard errors are clustered by recipient country - Same control variables as in Table 2 (Distance, Population, GDP per capita, Disaster, Democracy, Taiwan recognition, UNGA voting, and Exports)
- Dependent variable: Number of aid projects completed in recipient country (% of total number of aid projects provided by donor), 1995-2005 - We report marginal effects of the explanatory variables (corresponding z-values in parentheses)
- Oil production in (1) uses data from Humphreys (2005) and BP (2010); Oil production in (2) relies only on BP (2010) - In brackets: p-values of a Wald test of equal marginal effects of the respective donor (group) compared to China
- All regressions include donor (group) dummies and all explanatory variables are interacted with these dummies - * (**, ***) indicates significance at the ten (five, one) percent levelSignificant differences also emerge with respect to the EU-3 (2 variables), the United States 
(3 variables), and Japan (4 variables) – in all cases favoring recipients with good institutions. 
Therefore, overall it seems the fears that Chinese aid would undermine the efforts of other 
donors to  promote  democracy and  good governance are exaggerated.  Interestingly, Korea 
favors countries that score worse on the voice and accountability and control of corruption 
indices. 
Regarding politics, the results in Table 2 show that the United States and Japan reward 
countries voting in line with them in the United Nations General Assembly. The importance 
of political considerations for these donors is in line with previous research (Kuziemko and 
Werker 2006; Kilby 2011). We also find that Arab donors allocate a larger share of their aid 
projects to countries voting with them in the General Assembly, and surprisingly, the same 
holds for the average ‘good donor’. The Arab donors are, according to the UNGA voting 
measure, the only donors that put significantly more weight on political motives than China 
does.
52 At the one percent level of significance, Japan and the Arab donors give less aid to 
countries  recognizing  Taiwan.  It  seems  that  Japan,  as  China’s  main  regional  competitor, 
supports countries opposing China. Note however, that the quantitative effect of recognition is 
substantially larger in absolute terms for China than for the Arab donors and Japan. 
It is well known that donors’ commercial interests affect their allocation of aid. This is 
clearly  confirmed  in  Table  2.  The  share  in  the  donor’s  aid  portfolio  a  country  receives 
increases significantly with exports for most of the donors covered here. At the one percent 
level, this holds for the United States, the EU-3, the ‘good donors’ and Japan. Exports do not 
enter significantly into the regressions for Korea and the Arab donors. Interestingly, exports 
are not significantly more important for the allocation of Chinese aid compared to any of the 
other  donors  (with  the  exception  of  the  Arab  donors).  Similarly,  China  does  not  place 
significantly  more  emphasis  on  oil  production  than  its  peers,  as  can be  seen  in  the  final 
column of Table 2. 
The oil production variable has been chosen primarily for its good data coverage, but 
it does arguably not capture all facets of a country’s endowment with natural resources. In 
Table  4,  oil  production  (column 1)  is  replaced by  fifteen  alternative  measures of natural 
resource endowment; introduced one at the time. We start by varying the data source of the 
oil  production  variable  (column  2), replace  the  oil  amount  by  a  dummy  variable  simply 
                                                 
52 On strategic influences in Arab aid, see Villanger (2007). When we omit the Taiwan recognition variable from 
our regression, the importance of the UNGA voting alignment is again not statistically different from the effect 
for the United States, the ‘good donors’, Japan and Korea. However, China puts significantly more weight on 
politics than the EU-3, at the ten percent level of significance (full results available on request). 33 
 
indicating whether a country produces oil or not (column 3), and use oil reserves instead of 
production to better account for the future availability of oil (column 4). Rather than just 
focusing on oil, we also employ variables capturing the production of gas, coal, and diamonds 
(columns 5-7) and the unit resource rents and quantities of energy and minerals extracted 
(columns 8-9) to display a wider range of natural resources. As a next step, we account for 
total  and  bilateral  trade  with  fuel,  ore,  and  agricultural  raw  materials  (columns  10-15). 
Finally, we use a measure of a country’s natural capital as calculated by the World Bank 
(2010), which is defined as the sum of crop, pasture land, timber, non-timber forest, protected 
areas, oil, natural gas, coal, and minerals (column 16). Appendix A provides an overview of 
the sources and definitions of these variables. 
As illustrated in Table 4, other than one exception (bilateral imports of agricultural 
raw materials, column 15), there is no evidence that China provides, on average, significantly 
more aid to countries that are more abundant in natural resources, and the same holds for most 
other donor countries. With a few exceptions, there is also no evidence that China’s aid reacts 
more to natural resources compared to other donors. Compared to Korea, it even seems that 
China  pays  less  attention  to  these  resources.  Holding  all  other  variables  constant,  the 
respective tests of equal coefficients indicate that Korea’s aid program is more targeted to 
important producers of oil, gas and coal than is the case for China (columns 2 and 4-6). Again 
it seems that objections against aid from China are overstated. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
China is said to be the chief villain among the so-called new donors. It has been claimed that 
it strategically allocates its aid in order to get easy access to natural resources and to bribe 
countries  to get their  support  in international  politics.  It  is often  said  that  it  neglects  the 
recipient countries’ institutional quality, thus undermining other donors’ efforts to promote 
the worldwide spread of democracy and the rule of law. China’s development aid has even 
been characterized as ‘rogue aid’ (Naím 2007). In this paper, we confronted these claims with 
data. We collected information on the number of Chinese aid projects completed over the 
1956-2005 period, the amount of aid money (1956-1987), the number of medical teams sent 
(1983-1994), and food aid delivered (1988-2006). 
Using these data, we tested whether, and to what extent, Chinese aid was motivated by 
developmental,  governance-related,  political,  or  commercial  motives  over  five  phases  of 
China’s aid program. In the first phase (1956-1969), we expected China’s aid to be mainly 
driven by political and ideological considerations. In the second phase (1970-1978), Mao 34 
 
Zedong’s  claim  to  assume  political  leadership  in  the  Third  World  should  have  further 
strengthened political considerations in China’s aid allocation. After the death of Mao Zedong 
in 1976, China opened to the West and pursued more pragmatic foreign (and aid) policies. 
With the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, we expected economic considerations to become more 
influential  in  China’s  aid  allocation  decisions  in  the  third  phase  (1979-1989).  Political 
considerations  were  expected  to  dominate  again  in  the  fourth  phase  (1990-1995),  which 
started after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, where China sought actively for diplomatic 
support  and  increased  its  aid  substantially.  In  the  fifth  phase  (1996-2006),  we  expected 
market-oriented principles and  the  linkages  between aid,  trade and investment to become 
more important. 
Our  empirical  results  are  only  partly  in  line  with  these  expectations.  Indeed, 
commercial motives seem to be more relevant for China’s allocation of aid in the third and 
fifth phases. We find that politics are important in all five phases of China’s aid program. 
Countries that vote in line with China in the United Nations General Assembly and do not 
recognize Taiwan as independent country receive larger aid shares. The results show some 
evidence that China follows recipient need when deciding on its aid allocation as it favors 
countries with low per-capita income. Finally, China’s aid is for most of the time independent 
of the recipients’ institutional characteristics, which seems to confirm the non-interference 
principle. 
To put these results in perspective, we compared China’s aid allocation decisions in 
the  1996-2005  period  with those  of  traditional  DAC donor  countries  and  other  emerging 
donors. There is no evidence that China’s allocation of aid is inferior from a humanitarian 
point of view when compared to other donor countries. When it comes to democracy and 
indicators of governance, there is also little evidence that China’s allocation of aid is inferior. 
We  found that  China  does not  take  account of institutional quality  when  deciding on  its 
allocation of aid. However, the same holds for most other donors in our sample. In particular, 
we did not find that China’s aid is biased towards autocratic or corrupt regimes as claimed by 
its critics. Based on China’s aid allocation decisions, it seems that fears that Chinese  aid 
undermines  the  efforts  of  other  donors  to  promote  democracy  and  good  governance  are 
exaggerated. The same holds for commercial motives. While commercial interests matter, our 
empirical evidence does not support the idea that China puts greater weight on giving aid to 
neither  countries with strong commercial ties, nor  to  countries that are more  abundant in 
natural resources, in comparison to other donors. 35 
 
Our empirical findings confirm that China’s aid allocation decisions are shaped by 
politics. However, compared to the DAC and other emerging donors, the fact that political 
self-interest is part of China’s aid motives is not exceptional. While both China and DAC 
donors use  aid  for strategic reasons, China communicates more openly that  its aid serves 
mutual benefit. We find that China’s aid is independent of institutional characteristics, which 
confirms the non-interference principle. Overall, the verdict that China’s foreign aid is ‘rogue 
aid’ seems wide of the mark. 
A potential drawback of our study is the omission of aid provided by the China Exim 
Bank.  However,  since our study covers aid allocated by the Ministry of Commerce,  it is 
unlikely  that  this  omission  biases  our  results  against  finding  a  significant  impact  of 
commercial motives. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the concessional loans provided by 
the bank qualify as ODA. The omission could only be overcome if China were willing to 
publish detailed statistics on its development aid and other official flows. According to our 
results, greater transparency would be in China’s own interest. Comparing our results with 
anecdotal  evidence  prevalent  in  the  media,  it  seems  that  China  has  little  reason  to  be 
intransparent. Transparency might reduce fears about China’s aid program. 
Other  donors  seem to see China  mainly  as  competitor  (Brautigam  2008)  and this 
contributes to its negative image. They favor their own models of development. However, 
there is little evidence that the traditional development model works better. As pointed out by 
Brautigam (2008), the close relationship between Japan as a donor and China as recipient, 
might serve as role model for China’s aid in Africa. China still is a recipient of substantial 
development aid and has a lot in common with many recipients of its own aid. Therefore, 
Chinese aid might be more effective than that of the DAC donors, and developing countries 
might be more willing to listen to its advice (Davies 2007). That being said, the effectiveness 
of aid depends on factors other than the motives for its allocation. Different modes of delivery 
as well as project  design and  supervision might make  Chinese  aid more or less effective 
compared to aid of other donors. We leave this important question for future research. 
A  new  era  of  China’s  aid  program  started  in  2006  with  China  declaring  a  “new 
strategic partnership” at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). China announced 
to double its 2006 aid effort to Africa by 2009 with the aim “to reach the target of mutual 
benefit and win-win situation between China and African countries” (Ministry of Commerce 
2007: 416). Given the intransparent allocation of China’s aid, it remains to be seen whether 
these promises will (or have been) materialize(d). According to the results of this paper, a 
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Aid projects (Bartke/CCY) Number of aid projects completed in recipient country (% of total number of aid projects provided by donor), 1990-2005 Bartke (1989), Ministry of Commerce (1984-2009), Hawkins et al. (2010)
Aid amount (Bartke) Aid provided to recipient country in constant 2000 US$ (% of total aid provided by donor), 1956-1987 Bartke (1989)
Aid amount (CIA) Aid provided to recipient country in constant 2000 US$ (% of total aid provided by donor), 1956-1984 CIA (1975-1984)
Aid amount (OECD) Aid provided to recipient country in constant 2000 US$ (% of total aid provided by donor), 1970-1985 OECD (1987)
Medical teams (CCY) Number of medical teams dispatched to recipient country (% of total number of aid projects provided by donor), 1983-1994 Ministry of Commerce (1984-2009)
Food aid (FAIS) Food aid provided to recipient country in tons of grain equivalent (% of total food aid provided by donor), 1990-2006 Food Aid Information System (World Food Programme 2011)
Control variables
Distance (log) bilateral distance (weighted by populations of major cities) CEPII (Mayer and Zignago 2006)
Population (log) total population, average Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2009)
GDP per capita (log) GDP per capita (constant 2005 I$), average Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2009)
Disaster (log) number of people affected by disasters, average EM-DAT (2010)
Taiwan recognition 1 if recipient country recognizes Taiwan, average Rich (2009)
UNGA voting UNGA voting alignment between donor and recipient, average Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009)
Exports (log) exports to recipient country (constant 2000 US$), average Correlates of War (Barberini et al. 2008)
Governance and institutions
Democracy 1 if the regime qualifies as democratic, average Cheibub et al. (2010)
Voice Index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance, average Kaufmann et al. (2009)
Political stability Index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance, average Kaufmann et al. (2009)
Government effectiveness Index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance, average Kaufmann et al. (2009)
Regulatory quality Index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance, average Kaufmann et al. (2009)
Control of corruption Index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance, average Kaufmann et al. (2009)
Economic freedom Index ranging from 0 (not free) to 10 (free), average Gwartney et al. (2000)
Military dictatorship 1 if political regime of the recipient country is classified as a military dictatorship, average UTIP (Hsu 2008)
Natural resource endowment
Oil production (log) Oil production in millions of barrels per day, average Humphreys (2005), BP (2010)
Oil production (BP only) (log) Oil production in tonnes, average BP (2010)
Oil dummy 1 if oil is produced in recipient country, average BP (2010)
Oil reserves (log) Oil reserves in barrels, average BP (2010)
Gas production (log) Gas production in tonnes oil equivalent, average BP (2010)
Coal production (log) Coal production in tonnes oil equivalent, average BP (2010)
Diamond production (log) Diamonds production in metric carats, average Humphreys (2005)
Energy depletion (log) Product of unit resource rents and physical quanitites of energy extracted, average World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
Mineral depletion (log) Product of unit resource rents and physical quanitites of minerals extracted, average World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
Total fuel exports (log) Total fuels exports of recipient country in constant 2000 US$, average World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
Total OM exports (log) Total ores and metals exports of recipient country in constant 2000 US$, average World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
Total ARM exports (log) Total agricultural raw materials exports of recipient country in constant 2000 US$, average World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
Bilateral fuel imports (log) Bilateral fuels imports of donor country from recipient country in constant 2000 US$, average UN Comtrade via WITS (http://wits.worldbank.org)
Bilateral OM imports (log) Bilateral ores and metals imports of donor country from recipient country in constant 2000 US$, average UN Comtrade via WITS (http://wits.worldbank.org)
Bilateral ARM imports (log) Bilateral agricultural raw materials imports of donor country from recipient country in constant 2000 US$, average UN Comtrade via WITS (http://wits.worldbank.org)
Natural capital (log) Natural capital in constant 2000 US$, average (values for 2000 and 2005) World Bank (2010)
Notes:
- Values in current US$ have been transformed to constant 2000 US$ using US Consumer Price Indices from the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables)
- The value of 1 has been added to all trade and natural resource variables as well as to the number of people affected by disasters before taking logarithms43 
 
Appendix B: Descriptive statistics 
Variable # obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
Aid projects (Bartke/CCY) 528 0.751 1.265 0.000 12.222
Aid amount (Bartke) 267 0.876 1.762 0.000 13.898
Aid amount (CIA) 263 0.890 1.957 0.000 14.522
Aid amount (OECD) 200 0.878 1.700 0.000 10.126
Medical teams (CCY) 233 0.742 2.126 0.000 17.940
Food aid (FAIS) 261 0.394 2.436 0.000 29.551
Control variables
Distance 528 0.751 1.265 0.000 12.222
Population 267 0.876 1.762 0.000 13.898
GDP per capita 263 0.890 1.957 0.000 14.522
Disaster 200 0.878 1.700 0.000 10.126
Taiwan recognition 233 0.742 2.126 0.000 17.940
UNGA voting 261 0.394 2.436 0.000 29.551
Exports 528 15.803 3.969 0.000 22.548
Governance and institutions
Democracy 528 0.339 0.442 0.000 1.000
Voice 130 -0.425 0.791 -1.842 1.267
Political stability 130 -0.406 0.875 -2.556 1.365
Government effectiveness 130 -0.479 0.603 -1.987 1.283
Regulatory quality 130 -0.454 0.713 -2.402 1.397
Control of corruption 130 -0.464 0.620 -1.673 1.362
Economic freedom 277 5.505 0.925 3.051 7.494
Military dictatorship 432 0.160 0.327 0.000 1.000
Natural resource endowment
Oil production 528 4.467 5.782 0.000 16.070
Oil production (BP only) 528 4.383 7.390 0.000 19.951
Oil dummy 528 0.263 0.441 0.000 1.000
Oil reserves 361 5.461 9.602 0.000 26.294
Gas production 461 3.187 6.346 0.000 18.083
Coal production 365 1.649 4.875 0.000 18.736
Diamond production 442 2.010 4.848 0.000 16.889
Energy depletion 429 9.734 9.871 0.000 24.643
Mineral depletion 429 8.662 8.630 0.000 22.226
Total fuel exports 417 20.392 6.427 0.000 30.381
Total OM exports 426 21.202 3.941 0.000 27.636
Total ARM exports 429 21.769 3.062 0.000 27.162
Bilateral fuel imports 119 21.845 4.121 11.791 28.611
Bilateral OM imports 234 13.751 3.420 0.693 21.135
Bilateral ARM imports 274 12.735 4.897 0.000 20.447
Natural capital 197 24.232 2.222 13.915 28.788
Note:
- Descriptive statistics for sample as in Table 1, column 1 (phase 1-5)44 
 
Appendix C: Construction of the dataset on China’s project aid 
We constructed our dataset on the number of China’s aid projects completed based on two 
primary datasets: Bartke (1989) and Ministry of Commerce (1984-2007). The first source is 
Wolfgang Bartke’s book “The Economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist 
Countries.” It contains information on aid projects completed between 1956 and 1987 with 
detailed project  descriptions. The author  “feels  certain that  no  important  project [in  non-
communist  countries]  has  been  excluded,  especially  since  it  was  part  of  the  PR  China’s 
promotion of its own image up until 1978 to draw full attention of its economic aid” (Bartke 
1989: 5). However, concerning the coverage of certain communist recipient countries, the 
information on China’s foreign aid in Bartke (1989) is incomplete. Therefore, we exclude 
Albania,  Cuba,  Mongolia,  North  Korea  and  Vietnam  from  the  dataset.  Medical  groups 
(including acupuncture medical teams) were also excluded from the Bartke (1989) dataset to 
achieve better comparability with data from the China Commerce Yearbook discussed below. 
In those cases where no year of completion was registered, we estimate the year of 
completion by adding four years to the start year of a project (48 cases) or by adding five 
years to the year of signature (6 cases). These values correspond to the average duration of a 
project after signature or start. 8 of 528 projects had to be excluded from the analysis as 
information has been provided on neither the year of signature, nor the start year, nor the year 
of completion of the project. We keep 35 projects that were under construction at the time the 
book  was  published.  Projects  in  the  planning  stage,  in  turn,  were  not  included  in  our 
combined dataset. The construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway is counted twice, as one 
project in Tanzania and one project in Zambia. 
Second,  we  employ  data  on  China’s  project  aid  from  the  Ministry  of  Commerce 
(1984-2009),  which  provides  this  information  in  the  China  Commerce  Yearbook  and  its 
predecessors  –  the  Yearbook of China's Foreign  Economic  Relations  and  Trade, and  the 
Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. Data are collected by Hawkins et 
al.  (2010)  and  available  on the  AidData  webpage  (http://www.aiddata.org/research/china). 
The data cover the 1990-2005 period with the exception of 2002. For the 1983-1989 period, 
as well as the year 2006, the Ministry of Commerce (1984-2009) only provides information 
on whether or not an aid project was completed in a recipient country, without the possibility 
of deriving information on the number of projects per country. Altogether, the dataset consists 
of 304 aid projects provided to 97 developing countries (and Malta). 45 
 




Time period 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 3 4 4 5
Afghanistan 1.1 3.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.8 3.3 0.0 2.8 1.5 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Albania . . . 0.0 0.6 . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Algeria 3.3 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 6.5 2.4 0.0 5.1 1.3 0.0 1.2 0.0 17.5 17.5 0.0 0.0
Angola 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Anguilla 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Antigua and Barbuda 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Argentina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Armenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bangladesh 1.1 1.1 1.4 2.3 1.2 0.0 1.2 7.9 1.1 1.3 3.0 1.2 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1
Barbados 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belarus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belize 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Benin 0.0 1.1 1.8 2.8 3.4 0.0 1.7 2.0 0.0 1.3 0.7 1.4 <0.1 1.8 1.6 0.0 <0.1
Bhutan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1
Bolivia 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Botswana 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.7 0.1 0.8 1.4 1.7 9.3 0.0
Brazil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Burkina Faso 0.0 1.7 2.8 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.1 0.0 1.5 0.5 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.6 0.0
Burundi 0.0 0.0 1.4 2.8 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.6 3.0 0.6 5.7 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.0
Cambodia 23.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 3.4 4.8 0.3 0.0 9.1 . . 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cameroon 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.8 1.8 0.0 2.8 0.8 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.4 0.0 1.5 2.4 0.0 0.0
Cape Verde 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.6 1.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 <0.1 <0.1 1.9 0.4 0.5 0.9 <0.1
Central African Republic 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.9 0.0 1.3 1.4 0.4 0.0 <0.1
Chad 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.6 <0.1 0.1 0.8 0.0 <0.1
Chile 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Colombia 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Comoros 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.7 1.2 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Congo 3.3 3.3 0.9 1.1 0.9 4.8 2.5 3.4 2.5 1.5 6.4 1.1 2.4 3.0 2.8 0.0 <0.1
Cook Islands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Costa Rica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Croatia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cuba . . . 1.7 1.5 . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 0.0 1.7 2.3 0.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 <0.1 3.1 0.0 2.6 2.4 0.0 0.0
Djibouti 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.6 3.1 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 1.5 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
Dominica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dominican Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
East Timor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ecuador 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Egypt 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.6 0.6 3.0 0.0 10.2 0.8 6.7 0.8 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
El Salvador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equatorial Guinea 0.0 2.2 1.4 2.8 0.6 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.7 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.0
Eritrea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1
Ethiopia 0.0 1.7 1.8 1.7 0.6 0.0 4.1 1.1 0.0 2.7 2.5 2.7 0.2 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.2
Fiji 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.7 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gabon 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.2 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.5 2.0 0.0 0.0
Gambia 0.0 0.6 1.4 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 <0.1 1.8 1.9 0.0 0.0
Georgia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ghana 1.1 1.1 1.8 2.3 0.9 4.4 0.0 1.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Grenada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Guatemala 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1
Guinea 6.7 3.9 1.4 2.8 2.2 6.7 1.1 2.7 6.6 0.4 3.0 1.6 3.7 2.2 1.6 0.0 0.1
Guinea-Bissau 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.5 0.0 29.6 0.5
Guyana 0.0 1.7 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.0 2.2 0.6 0.0 1.0 0.2 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Haiti 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Honduras 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Iran 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(FAIS)
Completed aid projects Amount Amount Amount MedTeams Food aid 
(Bartke/CCY) (Bartke) (CIA) (OECD) (CCY)46 
 




Time period 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 3 4 4 5
Iraq 0.0 0.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 6.3 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ivory Coast 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Jamaica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Jordan 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kazakhstan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kenya 1.1 0.0 1.4 1.1 0.3 1.9 0.0 2.7 1.8 0.0 3.2 <0.1 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kiribati 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Korea, Dem. Rep. . . . 0.6 0.6 . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.8
Kyrgyzstan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Laos 1.1 5.6 0.5 0.6 1.5 1.1 1.7 0.0 0.0 . . 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1
Lebanon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lesotho 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.0
Liberia 0.0 0.6 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.7 0.0 0.5 2.8 0.5 4.9 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.1
Libya 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Macedonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Madagascar 0.0 1.7 3.2 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.2 3.1 0.0 2.2 0.0 1.9 4.0 2.4 2.5 0.0 <0.1
Malawi 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1
Malaysia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maldives 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mali 12.2 5.0 2.3 0.6 1.8 3.7 1.1 3.2 5.2 0.6 0.4 1.5 1.7 2.6 2.8 0.0 <0.1
Marshall Islands 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mauritania 1.1 5.0 3.2 3.4 1.2 0.4 1.4 3.6 0.4 2.2 1.1 2.3 3.8 2.9 2.4 7.6 0.1
Mauritius 0.0 0.6 0.9 2.3 0.6 0.0 1.2 1.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mayotte 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Micronesia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Moldova 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mongolia . . . 0.0 3.7 . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.7 <0.1
Montserrat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Morocco 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.2 <0.1 0.8 0.0 5.1 6.8 0.0 <0.1
Mozambique 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.1 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.3 1.4 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.8 9.3 <0.1
Myanmar 5.6 1.1 1.8 1.1 0.9 16.2 0.0 6.7 2.7 2.5 8.9 <0.1 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Namibia 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nauru 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nepal 5.6 4.4 4.6 2.3 2.5 7.0 1.3 1.0 6.4 3.7 3.4 4.3 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1
Nicaragua 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Niger 0.0 0.6 2.8 0.6 3.4 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 1.4 0.3 1.7 0.7 2.3 1.3 0.0 <0.1
Nigeria 0.0 0.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Niue 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Oman 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pakistan 2.2 5.0 4.1 0.0 0.9 13.9 12.4 2.5 14.5 11.9 9.5 9.8 2.4 0.0 0.0 1.5 <0.1
Palau 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Palestinian territories 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Panama 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Papua New Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Paraguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Peru 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 1.6 0.9 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Philippines 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.1 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rwanda 0.0 1.7 2.8 0.0 3.1 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.0 <0.1
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Saint Lucia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Saint Vincent and the Gr. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Samoa 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.1 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sao Tome and Principe 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.2 0.0 0.4 <0.1 0.3 0.0 1.1 1.4 0.0 <0.1
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Senegal 0.0 0.6 3.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 1.5 <0.1 1.5 <0.1 1.6 1.6 0.0 <0.1
Serbia / Yugoslavia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Seychelles 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.7 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.0 <0.1 0.0 <0.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0
Sierra Leone 0.0 7.8 2.8 4.0 0.9 0.0 0.8 3.3 0.0 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.0 0.0
Solomon Islands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(FAIS)
Completed aid projects Amount Amount Amount MedTeams Food aid 
(Bartke/CCY) (Bartke) (CIA) (OECD) (CCY)47 
 






Time period 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 3 4 4 5
Somalia 2.2 2.8 5.1 0.0 0.0 2.4 5.1 1.3 2.3 3.8 0.9 4.3 0.0 2.5 0.4 0.0 0.0
South Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sri Lanka 2.2 2.8 2.3 4.0 1.5 4.6 3.0 2.3 4.0 4.8 <0.1 4.3 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1
St Helens 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sudan 0.0 2.2 1.8 5.1 2.5 0.0 4.3 2.4 0.0 2.6 5.6 2.5 10.1 2.7 2.7 0.0 <0.1
Suriname 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Swaziland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Syria 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 1.2 1.7 3.1 0.0 1.6 1.6 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1
Tajikistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tanzania 18.9 12.8 2.8 4.5 4.6 5.6 12.9 5.7 5.6 9.2 13.7 9.2 2.7 5.3 6.7 0.0 0.0
Thailand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Togo 0.0 1.7 1.4 0.6 1.2 0.0 1.7 1.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.7 1.9 0.0 0.0
Tokelau 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tonga 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trinidad and Tobago 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tunisia 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.1 0.6 0.0 1.3 2.2 0.0 2.4 0.0 1.5 0.0 3.0 4.6 0.0 0.0
Turkey 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Turkmenistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tuvalu 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uganda 0.0 2.2 1.4 0.6 1.2 1.5 0.0 1.3 1.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 1.1 0.0 <0.1
Ukraine 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uzbekistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vanuatu 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Venezuela 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vietnam . . . 0.0 0.6 . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wallis and Futuna 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Yemen 7.8 2.8 4.6 1.7 0.6 5.3 1.9 0.6 5.8 1.7 0.0 1.8 0.0 14.8 15.9 0.0 <0.1
Zambia 0.0 1.7 2.8 1.7 2.8 2.3 6.3 1.3 1.6 8.9 0.9 8.7 1.4 2.1 2.1 9.4 <0.1
Zimbabwe 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 7.6 0.9 0.8 13.6 0.0
(FAIS)
Completed aid projects Amount Amount Amount MedTeams Food aid 
(Bartke/CCY) (Bartke) (CIA) (OECD) (CCY)